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We use a cross-sectional valuation model that distinguishes between the operating 
and financial activities of the firm to examine the repercussions of three main 
alternative measures of pension expense. The GAAP Method recognizes a 
smoothed net pension expense, the NETCOST Method includes the excess of 
interest cost over the actual return on pension plan assets, if and only if this 
number is positive, and the FV Method substitutes the fair value in place of the 
smoothed pension expense. Three alternative fair value estimates of pension 
expense are examined: the first includes the expected return on plan assets and fair 
value other costs; the second includes the actual return on plan assets and net fair 
value other costs; the third includes the expected and the unexpected return on 
plan assets, along with net fair value other costs. Results from OLS regressions 
are consistent with the GAAP Method being superior while the market appears to 
value the unexpected return included in the FV Method. Additional analyses from 
jack-knife (out-of-sample) regressions confirm the OLS findings. Further, we 
show that the multiples assigned to the alternative measures of pension expense 
differ based on the funding status of pension plans. The results are robust to 
various sensitivity checks. 
 
            Keywords: Pension Expense, Value Relevance, Defined Benefit Pension Plans 


















   
1 Introduction  
SFAS Nos. 87 and 132, the pension accounting standards governing the 
measurement, recognition and disclosure requirements during the time period of this 
study, incorporate a number of smoothing provisions to negate the earnings volatility that 
would otherwise arise. When characterizing the cost of sponsoring defined benefit 
pension plans to capital markets, SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 allow firms to use an expected 
rather than the actual return on pension plan assets in measuring net pension cost.1,2 
Differences between expected and actual returns, as well as discrepancies originating 
from the actuarial assumptions employed and actual experience, are amortized over long 
time horizons (White et al., 2003; Revsine et al., 2005; Chadwick, 1986; Gerson 
Lehrman, 2006; Schultz and Francis, 2003; Henry, 2001; Henry et al., 2002; Norris, 
2001; Jones and Walker, 2003). Over the years, various commentators have expressed 
concerns regarding the smoothing mechanisms embedded in SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 and 
suggested alternative ways of accounting for pensions.3 For example, S&P introduced its 
S&P Core Earnings concept in May 2002. This involves an alternative way of measuring 
pension expense that includes service cost and the excess of interest cost over the actual 
return on pension plan assets, but excludes pension earnings and other pension costs. 
Additionally, the FASB is currently reassessing the smoothing provisions inherent in 
SFAS Nos. 87 and 132. The above demonstrate that pension cost computation is 
important to the FASB’s agenda, as well as to that of other constituents.  
This study addresses how the market prices pension accruals. It does so by 
examining the value relevance of SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 pension expense (GAAP 
Method), an alternative measure of pension expense originally suggested by S&P 
(NETCOST Method) and a method that substitutes fair value pension expense for the 
smoothed pension expense reported under the GAAP Method (FV Method). 
Advocates of SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 appreciate the smoothing provisions 
embedded in the standard primarily because they reduce the pension cost and income 
volatility that would otherwise arise should the actual return on pension assets have been 
                                                 
1 The terms pension cost and pension expense will be used interchangeably.  
2 Hereinafter, the expected and the actual return on pension plan assets refer to the dollar expected and the 
dollar actual return on pension plan assets. 
3 Pension comprises one of FEI’s top 10 financial reporting issues (Deloitte, 2006). 
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used instead (Byrnes and Welsch, 2006; Wozniak and Chittim, 2006). Opponents of 
current practice, on the other hand, argue that pension earnings which reduce pension cost 
are misleading because they are based on expected returns and smoothed asset values 
rather than on actual pension asset returns. On top of that, actuarial gains or losses are 
amortized only if they exceed the 10% corridor threshold which results in deferred 
recognition of pension costs (Fortune, 2005; Norris, 2001). Other parties, such as S&P 
argue that pension earnings should not be considered in the calculation of pension 
expense because they do not belong to the firm.  
Pension expense computed under the GAAP Method is likely to result in a 
smoothed number. On the other hand, the pension expense computed according to the 
NETCOST method is likely to be more volatile primarily because of its consideration of 
actual pension asset returns when computing the interest cost, if any, to be charged 
against corporate income. In addition, the computation of interest cost under the 
NETCOST Method and the actual return on pension plan assets under the FV Method are 
likely to be less persistent because of the consideration of volatile market returns. These 
predictions are consistent with prior research discussing the merits and shortcomings of 
smoothed versus unsmoothed pension expense numbers (Hann et al., 2007a). The 
implications are clear: income under the NETCOST and FV methods will include 
transitory components which may reduce its persistence. Zion and Carcache (2002, p. 45) 
nevertheless note that the volatility is real and that “it’s not   a   bad   thing   unless   it   is   
hidden”.  They   argue   that   the   provisions   of   SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 designed to 
remove the volatility associated with firm pension plans result in misleading financial 
statement numbers. Investors will thus uncover the real volatility inherent in the pension 
plan only when reading the footnotes (Zion and Carcache, 2002; Wiedman and Weir, 
2005). The aforementioned discussion implies that it is not straightforward which pension 
cost measure is more value relevant. Rather this is an empirical question which this paper 
aims to shed more light on. 
We employ an adaptation of the cross-sectional valuation model originally used 
by Landsman (1986) which includes earnings in the spirit of Ohlson (1995), and which 
distinguishes between the operating and financial activities of the firm. In addition, we 
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use out-of-sample jack-knife regressions to identify which method of computing pension 
expense is associated with the lowest prediction errors. 
Our results show that the market behaves as if GAAP pension expense 
components are relevant while the unexpected return on plan assets included in FV 
pension expense is also significant. More specifically, disaggregated FV pension expense 
component regressions indicate that the alternative pension cost components are 
economically and statistically significant and the unexpected return on plan assets appears 
to be relevant. In contrast, the actual return on plan assets and fair value other pension 
costs included in two alternative FV Method specifications do not appear to be valued by 
the market. The disaggregated NETCOST Method regressions indicate that the valuation 
weight in the interest cost measure is not significantly different from zero. Findings from 
jack-knife regressions reinforce these results. Finally, we document different valuation 
effects for underfunded and overfunded pension plans.  
This study extends the existing body of literature and contributes to regulatory 
debate in several respects. This is the first study to examine the value relevance of the 
novel pension expense measure originally suggested by S&P. Second, the FASB has 
embarked on a comprehensive project to overhaul pension accounting which might result 
in the   elimination   of   the   smoothing   provisions  allowed  under  SFAS Nos. 87 and 
132 (Byrnes and Welsch, 2006; Wozniak and Chittim, 2006; Katz, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). 
In examining the value relevance of alternative pension expense measures, this study is 
therefore also relevant to this regulatory debate. Third, further research on pension cost 
accruals is justified considering that earlier research findings identified pension expense 
as an unequivocally relevant measure (Daley, 1984). Fourth, the existing body of 
literature examining the multiples assigned to pension expense has so far treated all 
defined benefit pension plans similarly. We extend the existing body of literature by 
examining the multiples assigned to overfunded versus underfunded pension plans. Fifth, 
our study contributes to the existing body of literature concerned with the multiples 
assigned to pension and non-pension components, as well as to the alternative pension 
cost components (Barth et al., 1992, 1993).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the regulatory 
background and prior literature relevant to this study. Section 3 presents the research 
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design and section 4 discusses the sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 5 
analyzes the empirical findings, section 6 discusses the sensitivity analysis and section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
2 The Regulatory Background and Prior Research 
2.1 A Firm’s Pension Assets and Liabilities 
A firm sponsoring a defined benefit plan has an obligation to retirees and current 
employees which is equal to the present discounted value of the future obligation. In 
effect, the firm has committed to a stream of future payments and it contributes money to 
a fund for that purpose. The regulatory position is that the firm’s contributions, along with 
the investment returns on this fund, should be adequate to meet the firm’s future 
obligation. From a legal viewpoint, this is equal to the accumulated benefit obligation. In 
practice, however, a firm’s pension obligation is more likely to be equal to the projected 
benefit obligation which includes an allowance for salary growth. The method used to 
compute a firm’s pension obligation, along with the actuarial assumptions made regarding 
mortality rates and discount rates, are likely to have a major impact on the determination 
of a firm’s pension obligation. This implies that a firm’s pension obligation is not rigidly 
determined, but rather depends on how this future obligation is defined and measured.   
In addition, the use of pension assets is restricted to meeting outstanding pension 
obligations and these are measured using fair values. This gives rise to two further, 
interrelated points regarding pension assets which form the basis for the present study. 
First, a firm’s rights over pension assets are not the same as over corporate assets. 
Second, a firm cannot easily recover excess pension assets. In fact, a going-concern firm 
has no legal entitlement to pension assets and Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA hereinafter) requirements dictate that the pension assets should be held for the 
benefit of current and future retirees.4 In addition, court challenges to reversions and 
attempts in Congress to disable excess asset reversals indicate that claiming excess 
pension assets is not straightforward. This is consistent with the separation hypothesis 
which views pension assets as distinct from corporate assets (House of Representatives 
                                                 
4 SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 do not require firms to recognize an asset when pension assets exceed liabilities 
whereas firms are obliged to record an additional minimum liability when the accumulated benefit 
obligation exceeds pension plan assets (FASB, 1985; Revsine et al., 2005). 
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Report, 1999; Welsh, 1991). Considering that the firm cannot easily recover excess 
pension assets directly, it therefore has to rely on the indirect benefits which may be 
achieved through reduced contributions or by taking contribution holidays. This is what 
brings the computation of pension costs and its associated conceptual issues to the 
forefront and it is also why the computation of pension cost is fiercely debated. The 
following sub-section outlines the rationale underlying the computation of pension 
expense as espoused by the current accounting standards governing pensions, the logic of 
the S&P and alternative FV approaches as well as more recent regulatory developments. 
 
2.2 Regulatory Background and Alternative Ways of Accounting for Pension Expense 
SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 govern measurement and disclosure requirements during 
the time period of this study. Under these accounting standards, pension expense is 
computed as the sum of service cost, interest cost and other pension costs reduced by the 
expected return on pension plan assets (GAAP Method).5 A central concern with regard to 
pensions appears to be the treatment of pension gains, calculated by multiplying the fair 
or smoothed pension asset value by the expected rate of return (FASB, 1985, 1998, 2003, 
2006a; Fore, 2004). Indeed, the expected rate of return might be a reasonable assumption 
in view of the long-term nature of pension obligations (Gerson Lehrman, 2006; Pulliam, 
1993). Using an expected return was strongly lobbied for by chief financial officers who 
have an aversion to the volatility that would ensue should the actual return on plan assets 
be used instead. However, the utilization of the expected rate of return has not been 
accepted without dispute. This is for the following reasons. First, using an expected return 
on assets, with the difference between actual and expected returns being recorded in other 
comprehensive income or recognized in the income statement according to the corridor 
method, has been heavily criticized. In particular, it is contended that such an approach 
using a hypothetical expected rate of return produces highly misleading income statement 
and balance sheet numbers (Cooper et al., 2007; Nashwa, 2003). Second, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC hereinafter) has scrutinized the expected rates of return 
used by US firms (SEC, 2003) and anecdotal as well as prior empirical evidence suggest 
                                                 
5 Other pension costs include, for example, the amortization of unrecognized prior service cost, the 
amortization of unrecognized assets/liabilities, the changes in the projected benefit obligation, gains or 
losses and one-off charges for plan amendments. 
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that firms utilize unrealistically high expected rates of return with a view to boosting 
reported income (Wiedman and Goldberg, 2002; Bergstresser et al., 2006; Amir and 
Benartzi, 1997; Milliman Consultants and Actuaries, 2006). Finally, some market 
participants suggest that pension earnings should not be regarded as corporate earnings 
(Standard and Poor’s, 2002a; Katz, 2002). 
 Dissatisfaction with the prevailing way of measuring pension expense has 
resulted in alternative suggestions about how to compute it (Buffett and Loomis, 2001; 
Ciesielski, 2001; Zion and Carcache, 2002; Coy, 2002; Standard and Poor’s, 2002a; Goff 
and Reason, 2002). In May 2002, S&P released its “Measures of Corporate Earnings” 
white paper and pioneered the introduction of S&P Core Earnings which involves an 
alternative way of measuring pension costs. S&P’s alternative measure was introduced in 
the context of a proliferation of alternative earnings constructs as many firms responded 
to both a belief that GAAP net income did not provide an adequate representation of their 
operations, and to Wall Street pressure to meet earnings expectations. The latter 
proliferation rendered the comparability of earnings across firms and even at the firm 
level through time either difficult or impossible (Anonymous, 2003a; Blitzer, 2004; 
Blitzer et al., 2002; FASB, 1985; Jagannathan, 2002; Standard and Poor’s, 2002a). 6,7  
In determining the pension cost components to be included in the S&P pension 
expense measure, S&P views the pension plan as distinct from the firm and thus attempts 
to separate the components of pension expense that represent pension costs, and that 
should therefore be included in S&P Core Earnings, from the pension gains which belong 
to the pension plan and which should not be considered when calculating pension costs. 
This approach to calculating pension cost contrasts sharply with the one currently 
advocated by the FASB which does not view the pension plan and the firm as distinct 
entities (Standard and Poor’s, 2002c). More specifically, S&P considers service cost, 
                                                 
6 Companies seem to adopt three different earnings measures in characterizing the results of operations to 
the investment community: reported earnings, operating earnings and pro forma earnings. For a detailed 
discussion, refer to Blitzer et al., (2002). 
7 S&P’s approach to measuring earnings focuses on a firm’s ongoing operations and includes stock option 
expenses, restructuring charges, write-downs of depreciable or amortizable operating assets, pension costs, 
purchased research and development expenses, merger and acquisition-related expenses and unrealized 
gains or losses from hedging activities as part of S&P Core Earnings. On the other hand, goodwill 
impairment charges, gains and losses from asset sales, pension gains, litigation or insurance settlements and 
proceeds and reversal of prior-year charges and provisions are excluded from Core Earnings (Blitzer et al., 
2002; Anonymous, 2003a;  Jagannathan, 2002). 
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which represents deferred compensation, to be part of pension costs charged against 
corporate income. Even though   S&P’s   treatment   of   service   cost   is   similar   to   
that   adopted   under   SFAS Nos. 87 and 132, S&P adopts a fundamentally different 
approach when determining the interest cost pertinent to defined benefit plans. S&P 
views interest cost as a financing cost and notes that pension gains on a well-funded plan 
should be adequate to pay the interest cost. In determining the interest cost to be charged 
against corporate income, S&P compares the reported interest cost to the actual return on 
pension plan assets. If the actual return on pension plan assets exceeds the interest cost, 
there is no charge against corporate income. This is equivalent to pension cost consisting 
of service cost only.8 However, the excess of interest cost over the actual return on 
pension plan assets will be borne by the firm. Hence, in a bear market, or where a pension 
fund is not well managed, pension cost will incorporate an interest cost charge which 
could be indicative of a potentially underfunded plan (Standard and Poor’s, 2002a, 2002b, 
2002c). The consideration of actual market returns in the computation of pension cost 
represents a move towards fair value accounting.  
S&P argues that returns on plan assets should not be included as part of corporate 
income because they do not represent funds readily available to the firm or its 
shareholders, a view corroborated by other market commentators (Bryan-Low, 2003).9 In 
addition, the expected rather than the actual return is used in computing pension cost such 
that, as is quite emphatically argued, “not only is net pension income not the company’s 
money, the money itself may not even be there” (Blitzer, 2004, p. 195). In summary, the 
S&P pension expense includes service cost and the excess of interest cost over the actual 
return on pension plan assets, if any (NETCOST Method).10 Examining the relevance of 
the NETCOST Method pension expense measure is interesting for the following reasons: 
first, S&P is an important user. Second, S&P’s pension cost computation, by viewing 
pension fund assets as belonging solely to retirees addresses one important aspect of the 
                                                 
8 An alternative measure of pension cost consisting of service cost only has also been proposed by other 
market participants on the basis that it comprises the only operating component of pension costs (Zion and 
Carcache, 2002; Ciesieski, 2001).  
9 The firm can only claim pension assets in special cases such as plan terminations (Blitzer et al., 2002). 
Even in those cases, it is not straightforward.  
10 It should be noted that in this paper we focus on examining only the pension cost adjustments made by 
S&P. The results presented do not therefore have any implications for S&P Core Earnings which include a 
number of additional adjustments as discussed in footnote 7. 
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underlying economics of pension accounting that is not explicitly addressed in the 
authoritative literature.11 Finally, the calculation of pension costs under the NETCOST 
Method represents a fair value-based approach and highlights the importance of actual 
pension asset returns. The S&P approach to calculating pension costs has nevertheless 
been criticized on the grounds that it introduces volatility in reported numbers (FEI, 2002; 
Standard and Poors, 2002c). Additionally, it is interesting to note that according to S&P, 
the determination of the interest cost component is based on the financial performance of 
the pension plan. This suggests that the net cost to the sponsor caused by poor returns on 
the pension portfolio is relevant in the determination of pension expense. The 
controversial aspect, however, is that operating surpluses on the pension fund are not 
perceived to belong to the firm, which introduces an asymmetry. 
Opponents of SFAS No. 87 have also suggested that accounting for pensions 
within a fair value framework may be legitimate, especially because if overoptimistic 
expected rates of return are used firms will be able to report pension income rather than 
pension expense, even when not warranted by prevailing market conditions and portfolio 
returns (Alix, 2005; Amlie, 2004; Kwan, 2003; Henry et al., 2002; Shaw, 2005). In this 
case, fair value pension expense would include the sum of service cost, interest cost, 
expected return on pension plan assets and fair value other pension costs arising out of 
unexpected returns and differences between the actuarial assumptions employed and 
actual experience. An alternative measure of fair value pension expense would include 
the service cost, the interest cost, the actual instead of the expected return on pension plan 
assets and net fair value other pension costs (which include all fair value other pension 
costs apart from differences between the actual and the expected return on plan assets). 
The two aforementioned measures of fair value pension expense differ only in terms of 
the underlying disclosure requirements. Fair value net pension assets would be computed 
as the difference between the fair value of pension plan assets and projected benefit 
obligations (FV Method). The FV Method of accounting for pension expense has also 
been heavily criticized because although it is ‘real’ and realized, it is also likely to 
introduce considerable volatility into the computation of pension cost as it fluctuates from 
                                                 
11 GAAP appears to adopt a mixed approach by recognizing a smoothed net pension asset in the balance 
sheet whereas under fair value, the fair value of net pension assets would be recognized in the balance sheet 
of the plan sponsor, implying that pension rights lie fully with the firm. 
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year-end to year-end (Fore, 2004). Additionally, aggregating permanent and transitory 
components, which is the case when either fair value other pension costs or actual returns 
on plan assets are used, is likely to hinder the value relevance of income statement 
numbers. Indeed, reporting the actual return on pension plan assets is not necessarily 
regarded as helpful for forecasting future returns on the pension portfolio and is not an 
appropriate measure to use when evaluating the overall business performance (e.g. 
Cooper et al., 2007).12,13 In this respect, disaggregating the permanent from the transitory 
pension cost components while recognizing changes in actuarial assumptions and 
unexpected returns represents an alternative fair value pension expense measure. Hence, a 
fair value pension expense alternative which includes both the expected return on plan 
assets and the difference between the actual and the expected return as an additional 
component along with net fair value other pension costs, and which also recognizes the 
fair value of net pension assets, is likely to provide more relevant information to investors 
by keeping them aware of the true change in pension assets (Cooper et al., 2007).  
 
2.3 Prior Research 
The prior literature focuses on the multiples assigned to the alternative pension 
cost components during the SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 periods as well as the value relevance 
of off-balance sheet pension assets and liabilities. In examining the value relevance of 
pension and non-pension cost components, Barth et al., (1992, 1993) find that the various 
components of pension expense are correctly priced. More recently, Liebana and Vincent 
                                                 
12 SFAS No. 158 issued in September 2006, which amends the previous accounting standards, moves 
towards a fair value framework by requiring recognition of the funding status of the pension plan in the 
balance sheet even though actuarial gains or losses are recognized as part of other comprehensive income. 
This is in sharp contrast to SFAS No. 87 according to which firms start with the funding status of the 
pension plan and are then allowed to make smoothing adjustments that often significantly reduce the 
amount reported in the balance sheet. The off-balance sheet assets and liabilities often concealed the 
funding status of defined benefit pension plans. In addition, actuarial gains or losses are only reported in the 
pension footnote. 
13 The second phase of the FASB’s comprehensive project to overhaul pension accounting addresses issues 
relating to the measurement and recognition of pension costs in the income statement and is therefore 
directly relevant to this study (FASB, 2006b). It is speculated that the FASB might remove the smoothing 
mechanisms underlying the calculation of pension costs by requiring firms to use the actual instead of the 
expected return on pension plan assets, a move which would involve immediate recognition of gains and 
losses in reported income. Alternatively, the amortization period over which discrepancies between actual 
and expected returns, as well as differences between actuarial assumptions and actual experience, are 
recognized, may be reduced (Amlie, 2004; Moran and Cohen, 2005; Shaw, 2005; Yoon, 2005).  
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(2004) report mixed results regarding the value relevance of alternative pension cost 
components. To identify whether stock prices reflect the fair value of net pension assets 
as reported in the pension footnote, or pension cost accruals included in the pension 
expense reported in the income statement, Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Coronado et 
al., (2006) test the transparent against the opaque view of pension accounting originally 
articulated by Gold (2005). They find that stock prices reflect information included in the 
pension cost accruals, consistent with the opaque view of pension accounting.14 The prior 
literature also examines the value relevance of postretirement benefit liability and cost 
components (Amir, 1993, 1996; Choi et al., 1997; Davis-Friday et al., 1999, 2004; 
Mittelstaedt and Warhawsky, 1993). While there is evidence that postretirement benefit 
obligations are significant but are capitalized at a lower rate compared to pension 
obligations (e.g. Choi et al., 1997), Davis-Friday et al., (2004) show that recognized 
postretirement benefit obligations do not appear to be less reliable compared to pension 
obligations.15  
SFAS No. 158, effective after fiscal year ending December 15 2006, requires 
recognition of the fair value of net pension assets in the balance sheet. The prior literature 
has examined the value relevance of the off-balance sheet pension assets and liabilities 
that will now have to be recognized and showed that the market treats pension assets and 
liabilities as corporate assets and liabilities16 (Barth, 1991; Barth et al., 1993; Landsman, 
1986; Landsman and Ohlson, 1990; Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue, 1993). Hence, with 
some exceptions (e.g. Coronado and Sharpe, 2003; Liebana and Vincent, 2004), research 
findings provide evidence regarding the recognition of pension assets and liabilities in the 
balance sheet consistent with the requirements of SFAS No. 158. 
                                                 
14 Picconi (2006) finds that analysts do not consider the information disclosed in the pension footnote but 
there is evidence to suggest that investors take into account pension amounts that have already been 
recognized in income. Further, Brown (2004) concludes that analysts discount firms’ aggressive actuarial 
assumptions and Asthana (2001) shows that the market does not value the discretionary component of the 
postretirement benefit obligation. Finally, while Feldstein and Morck (1983) find that the market adjusts 
pension obligations using a standard interest rate, Hann et al., (2007b) conclude that the flexibility that 
firms enjoy in setting the actuarial assumptions does not impair the value relevance of the projected benefit 
obligation. On the contrary, the results suggest that the discretionary component of pension obligations is 
incrementally value relevant.  
15 Around the time that the Exposure Draft on non-pension benefits was issued Espahbodi et al., (1991) 
documented negative abnormal returns, especially for small firms with few retirees and high debt ratios. In 
contrast, Khurana and Loudder (1994) did not find similar evidence for rate-regulated firms. 
16 Feldstein and Seligman (1981) conclude that share prices reflect the value of unfunded pension liabilities.  
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More recently, Hann et al., (2007a) compare the value and credit relevance of 
smoothed versus fair income statement and balance sheet pension values. Overall, they 
find that fair values hinder the value and credit relevance of the income statement and 
balance sheet combined. This is largely attributed to transitory unrealized gains and 
losses.  
 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Valuation Model and Variable Measurement  
This study addresses the following question: How does the market price pension 
accruals? It does so by examining the contemporaneous association between stock prices 
and alternative pension expense measures using a cross-sectional valuation model 
originally used by Landsman (1986), which includes earnings following Ohlson (1995) 
and which distinguishes between the operating and financial activities of a firm. More 
specifically, we examine the GAAP pension expense versus the NETCOST alternative 
pension cost measurement as well as three alternative measures of fair value pension 
expense. The first includes the expected return on plan assets and fair value other pension 
costs including the currently off-balance sheet actuarial gains or losses, the second 
substitutes the actual for the expected return on plan assets and the third decomposes the 
actual return on plan assets into its expected and unexpected return components.17 
We initially estimate an aggregate regression of the market value of equity on net 
income and book value of common equity, as follows:  
 
 
0 1 2jt jt jMVE NI BVE t jtβ β β ε= + + +  (1)
 
where MVE is equity market value at fiscal year-end, is income and is the book 
value of common equity.
NI BVE
18 GAAP Method  is GAAP net income before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations and NETCOST Method is GAAP net income before 
NI
NI
                                                 
17 The last two measures of fair value pension expense also include net fair value other pension costs. The 
latter include the impact of differences between actuarial assumptions and actual experience but do not 
include unexpected returns.  
18 All variables are deflated by the number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year-end, adjusted for 
stock splits and dividends.  
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extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus the after-tax SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 
pension expense minus the after-tax NETCOST Method pension expense.19 The 
NETCOST Method pension expense consists of the sum of service cost ( )  and 
the adjusted interest cost defined as the excess of the reported interest cost over the actual 
return on pension plan assets
SERVCOST
( )[ ]{ }0,_$max RETURNACTUALINTCOSTADJINT −= . 
We subsequently disaggregate Eq. (1) into its pension and non-pension components, as 
follows:    
 { } { }0 1 2 3 4jt jt jt jt jt jtMVE ADJNI PENSEXP BVEADJ NPAβ β β β β= + + + + +ε
                                                
(2)
                                                                                                                                        
where  is income before pension expense and PENSEXP is pension expense 
(income) calculated according to the various alternative methods outlined previously. 
GAAP pension expense is pension expense as reported under SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 and 
NETCOST Method pension expense is as defined above. BVEADJ is the book value of 




20 According to the NETCOST Method, firms’ net pension deficits will 
only be recognized in the balance sheet, which is consistent with a labor economics 
perspective (Klumpes, 2001; Wiedman and Weir, 2004; Kemp, 1985). We therefore 
include the fair value of plan assets (FAIRNPA) and an interaction variable equal to the 
fair value of net pension assets multiplied by a dummy variable, SURPLUS_DUM, equal 
to 1 if the pension plan is overfunded, and 0 otherwise (FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM). 
FAIRNPA will capture net pension deficits. 
To   examine   whether   the   market   assigns   different   multiples   to the 
various GAAP Method pension expense components, we disaggregate GAAP pension 




19 A 35% statutory tax rate is used to calculate the after-tax values. 
20 The prior literature has generally assumed that the book value of net pension assets is zero and did not 
adjust the book value of equity for recognized net pension assets (e.g. Barth, 1991). According to GAAP, 
firms have to recognize prepaid pension assets and/or accrued pension liabilities in the consolidated balance 
sheet (Revsine et al., 2005). We therefore adjust the book value of common equity for the book value of 
recognized net pension assets. 
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where SERV_COST is service cost, INTCOST is interest cost and OTHER_COST  
includes all the other components comprising pension cost other than service cost, interest 
cost and the expected return on pension plan assets. In essence, OTHER_COST includes 
the amortization of differences between the actual and expected return on plan assets as 
well as differences between actuarial assumptions and actual experience. $EXP_RETURN 
is the expected return on pension plan assets. We expect β1 > 0, β2 < 0, β3 < 0, β4 < 0, β5 
> 0, β6 > 0 and β7 > 0. To the extent that β2 proxies for any omitted human capital aspect, 
we deal empirically with this issue in Section 5. We have no strong expectations 
regarding the magnitude of the coefficients because the determinants of the coefficients 
will depend on a range of issues. For example, in the case of income statement variables, 
persistence and risk are expected to be important. 
To examine whether fair value pension expense is used instead of the reported 
smoothed pension expense, we adjust Eq. (3) and replace OTHER_COST with 
OTHER_FAIRCOST and NPA with FAIRNPA as follows: 
 


















where OTHER_FAIRCOST is defined as other pension costs under fair value accounting 
and will basically include actuarial gains and losses originating from differences between 
actuarial assumptions and actual experience, and differences between actual and expected 
returns on pension assets. Considering that data on actuarial gains and losses are not 




   
RETURNEXPINTCOSTSERVCOSTFVPEFAIRCOSTOTHER _$_ −−−= (5) 
where FVPE is fair value pension cost. Pension cost under fair value accounting would 
consist of service cost, interest cost, the expected return on pension plan assets and fair 
value other pension costs. Hence, estimating OTHER_FAIRCOST is straightforward 
using Eq. (5) by subtracting service cost, interest cost and the expected return on pension 
plan assets from fair value pension cost. Because we do not observe fair value pension 
cost, we estimate it following Hann et al., (2007a) as follows: 
 
 FAIRNPACONTRIBFVPE Δ−=  
 
where CONTRIB is employer contributions and FAIRNPAΔ  is the change in the fair 
value of net pension plan assets adjusted for employee contributions and the payment of 
benefits to pensioners. To the extent that OTHER_FAIRCOST is measured with error 
because of the estimates involved, this would reduce the power of our tests.21 To satisfy 
the clean surplus condition, net pension asset is defined as the difference between the fair 
value of pension plan assets and the projected benefit obligations reported in the pension 
footnote (FAIRNPA=PENSASSET-PENSLIAB). PENSASSET is the fair value of pension 
plan assets and PENSLIAB  is the projected benefit obligation.  
The inclusion of $EXP_RETURN in Eq. (4) may seem like a violation of fair 
value accounting. However, $EXP_RETURN captures revisions in expected return 
estimates, whereas OTHER_FAIRCOST captures actuarial gains or losses and unexpected 
asset returns. Hence, the sum of SERVCOST, INTCOST, $EXP_RETURN and 
OTHER_FAIRCOST represents a fair value estimate of pension expenses.  
We subsequently replace $EXP_RETURN and OTHER_FAIRCOST with 




                                                 
21 As a sensitivity check, we also use another approach to estimate fair value pension expense and hence 
OTHER_FAIRCOST following Hann et al., (2007a). More specifically, we calculate fair value pension 
expense as the sum of SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 pension expense plus the change in the SFAS Nos. 87 and 
132 net pension assets minus the change in the fair value of net pension assets. Using this alternative 
pension expense to estimate OTHER_FAIRCOST yields substantially similar results. 
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where $ACTUAL_RETURN  is the actual return on pension plan assets. 
$ACTUAL_RETURN is not, however, equal to $EXP_RETURN plus 
OTHER_FAIRCOST; rather it is the sum of $EXP_RETURN plus $UNEXP_RETURN. 
$UNEXP_RETURN is the difference between the actual and the expected return on 
pension plan assets. The latter is only one of the components included in 
OTHER_FAIRCOST. In this model specification, we therefore include net fair value other 
pension costs which include differences between actuarial assumptions and actual 
experience, but do not include unexpected returns. We estimate the fair value net other 
pension costs by subtracting the unexpected return from the fair value of other pension 
costs ( )RETURNUNEXPFAIRCOSTOTHERFAIRCOSTNETOTHER _$__ −= .  
To examine whether the market assigns different multiples to the components 
comprising $ACTUAL_RETURN in Eq. (6) and shed more light on the key issue of 
expected versus actual plan asset returns, we augment Eq. (6) by decomposing 
$ACTUAL_RETURN into its expected ($EXP_RETURN) and unexpected components 
($UNEXP_RETURN) as follows: 
 






















We expect the unexpected return to have a smaller coefficient than the expected return 
because of its transitory nature.  
To assess the multiples assigned to the NETCOST Method pension expense, we 




   















The interest cost component of the NETCOST Method of pension expense is bounded 
because it is clustered around zero values since no interest cost is charged against 
corporate income if the actual return on pension plan assets covers the interest cost 
component of pension expense. The following sub-section presents a more general 
method to examine the value relevance of the NETCOST Method pension expense 
measure. 
 
3.2 Estimating Disaggregated NETCOST Method Pension Expense Component 
Regressions 
To assess the multiples assigned to the alternative NETCOST Method pension 

























where   if 1_ =DUMFIN RETURNACTUALINTCOST _$< , and 0 otherwise. 
captures cases where , i.e. the NETCOST Method. 
 is also interesting because it tells us whether the NETCOST Method omits value 
relevant information from the interest cost measure. Presumably, proponents of the 




To examine the multiples assigned to the expected versus the unexpected returns 
on plan assets, we decompose $ACTUAL_RETURN into its permanent ($EXP_RETURN) 
and transitory components ($UNEXP_RETURN) and include interaction variables for the 
interest cost, expected and unexpected return conditioned on whether the interest cost is 
less than the actual return on pension plan assets as follows: 
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4 Sample and Descriptive Analysis 
The initial sample consists of 5,155 firm-year observations drawn from the 
Compustat Industrial, Full Coverage, Research and Coreann files. Data on the smoothed 
and fair value net pension assets are hand-collected. We subsequently eliminate firms that 
do not sponsor a defined benefit plan by deleting observations for which the projected 
benefit obligations, pension plan assets, service cost, interest cost, expected return on 
pension plan assets and actual return on pension plan assets are all equal to zero. 
Secondly, there are a number of observations for which the actual return is equal to the 
expected return on pension plan assets. The likelihood of such an occurrence is fairly low, 
considering that this entails perfect foresight on the part of plan sponsors: the expected 
return is merely based on a long-term assumption, whereas the actual return reflects how 
the portfolio of pension assets actually performed. After manually checking those 
observations against company 10-Ks and annual reports, 186 firm-year observations for 
which Compustat has incorrectly coded the expected return on pension plan assets are 
deleted.22 Thirdly, we delete 147 firm-year observations because these firms offer 
Supplemental Executive Retirement (SERP) plans. The latter are excluded because they 
are generally unqualified, unfunded plans subject to different tax and benefit security 
advantages compared to qualified defined benefit plans. Fourthly, we eliminate 50 firm-
year observations which include a zero value for either the expected or the actual return 
on pension plan assets as these plans represent special cases. 23 This results in 4,403 firm-
                                                 
22 Before SFAS No. 132, firms were required under SFAS No. 87 to report the actual instead of the 
expected return on pension plan assets and to include differences between actual and expected returns on 
pension assets in a deferred account.  A few companies continued to report the actual return in the pension 
cost table post-SFAS No. 132. Compustat, however, incorrectly codes this item as the expected return on 
pension plan assets.  
23 For example, Comdial has frozen its pension plan and does not report a value for the expected return on 
pension plan assets despite the fact that the pension plan maintains a portfolio of assets and for which it 
reports an investment gain. House2home Inc. and West Marine Inc. report a zero expected return on 
pension plan assets because the defined benefit plans have been frozen and Natco Group and Multi Color 
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year observations (Table 1, Panel A). Finally, we delete the top and bottom 1% of actual 
asset returns and firm-year observations with negative book value of equity. The final 
sample contains 3,388 observations.24 
The pension footnote from CTS Corp’s 2005 annual report, a manufacturer of 
electronic components and sensors, and a supplier of electronics manufacturing services, 
is used to illustrate the variables employed in the empirical analysis (Appendix 1). Table 
1, Panel B presents the components included in GAAP, NETCOST and FV pension 
expense. The numbers in parentheses correspond to numbered items in the tables included 
in Appendix 1. CTS Corp’s pension expense under GAAP is equal to -$7 million which 
represents pension income (item 11).  This consists of the sum of service cost equal to 
$5.2 million (item 7), interest cost, $11.3 million (item 8), amortization equal to $2.1 
million (item 10) reduced by the expected return on pension plan assets, –$25.7 million 
(item 9). The estimated pension expense figure of $7.8 million under the NETCOST 
Method contrasts sharply with the $7 million reported pension income under the GAAP 
Method. The NETCOST Method pension cost is equal to the sum of service cost, $5.2 
million (item 7), and the excess of the interest cost over the actual return on pension plan 
assets, $2.6 million (items 8-4). Lastly, using the actual return instead of the expected 
return results in an even higher pension cost figure ($13.5 million) compared to the 
NETCOST Method. This is calculated by subtracting the actual return on pension plan 
assets and plan amendments from the sum of service cost, interest cost and other pension 
costs including actuarial losses (items 7+8+2-1-4).25 This example from CTS Corp. 
highlights the dramatic differences in computed pension cost that can occur under the 
different accounting methods. The recognized net pension asset under SFAS Nos. 87 and 
132 is equal to $147.8 million (item 6). The fair value of pension plan assets is equal to 
$277 million (item 5) and the projected benefit obligation is equal to $208.6 million (item 
3), resulting in a fair value net pension asset equal to $68.4 million. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Corp. terminated their plans. Some of these observations appear to be recording errors in the database and 
some others are foreign firms. 
24 The top and bottom 1% of all other variables used in the empirical analysis are winsorized. 
25 Pension expense including service and interest cost plus (a) the expected return on pension plan assets 
and fair value other pension costs, (b) the actual instead of the expected return on pension plan assets 
together with net fair value other pension costs and (c) the expected along with the unexpected return and 
net fair value other pension costs, will be similar. 
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Table 2 presents sample descriptive statistics. GAAP income before extraordinary 
items is higher compared to NETCOST Method adjusted income. As expected, NETCOST 
Method pension expense is more volatile compared to GAAP pension expense because 
pension expense under SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 is designed to provide a smoothed estimate 
of long-term pension costs. The NETCOST Method’s pension expense volatility stems 
mainly from the consideration of actual pension asset returns when determining the 
interest cost to be charged against corporate income. Excluding pension earnings from the 
computation of NETCOST Method pension expense also means that the NETCOST 
Method pension cost will on average be higher. Indeed, pension earnings which are 
included in GAAP but not in the NETCOST Method pension expense are on average 
$0.48 per share. Interestingly, the median expected return on pension plan assets is on 
average markedly higher than the actual return on pension plan assets for the sample, 
consistent with concerns that have been raised about the apparently overoptimistic 
estimates of expected rates of return on plan assets reported by firms.  
Yearly descriptive analysis of GAAP and NETCOST Method pension expense 
indicates that the average NETCOST Method pension expense was higher than GAAP 
pension expense in the years 1998 to 2002. This pattern reversed after 2002, although the 
differences are not as remarkable as pre-2002 (see Table 3, Panels A and B). Additional 
untabulated analyses of the components comprising GAAP pension expense over time 
show that lower average expected returns on plan assets and higher other pension costs 
were the main contributors to the reported increase in GAAP pension expense from 2003 
onwards. The decrease in NETCOST Method pension expense, on the other hand, is the 
result of higher average actual market returns on pension portfolios which dramatically 
reduced the NETCOST Method interest cost component. In fact, untabulated results 
suggest that there is a higher frequency of zero NETCOST Method interest cost values 
post-2002 (1,144) as opposed to pre-2002 (650).26 
                                                 
26 Untabulated results suggest that pension expense is a significant component of income before 
extraordinary items adjusted for pension expense. The ratio of average NETCOST pension expense to 
income adjusted for pension expense is more significant from 1998 to 2002 while the ratio of GAAP 
pension expense to income adjusted for pension expense is higher post-2002, consistent with the previous 
analysis. 
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5 Empirical Results 
5.1 OLS Aggregate Regressions 
Table 4 presents the findings. Panel A reports the results of the aggregate GAAP 
and NETCOST Method regressions. All regression models include fixed-year and industry 
effects, and consistent with the prior literature (Subramanyam and Zhang, 2001; Hann et 
al., 2007a), control for the size of the workforce and research and development expense.27  
The magnitude of the net income coefficient under the GAAP Method is higher 
than that of the NETCOST Method. A possible reason could be that the items included in 
the NETCOST Method are transitory. The explanatory power of the GAAP Method is 
slightly higher compared to the NETCOST Method but the differences are negligible (R2 
of 51.05 versus 50.45). The book value of common equity and the coefficients on the 
control variables – number of employees and research and development expense – are 
positively signed and statistically significant, consistent with expectations.  
 
5.2 OLS Disaggregated Pension Expense Regressions 
Table 4, Panel B, decomposes income and book value of equity into the respective 
pension and non-pension components. Consistent with expectations, GAAP Method 
pension expense is negatively signed and statistically significant. The GAAP Method net 
income coefficient is similar in magnitude to that in the aggregate model while the 
pension expense coefficient is larger in absolute value (9.42) compared to net income 
before pension expense (7.63). This might reflect the lower risk investors assign to the 
smoothed pension expense. Additionally, this finding is consistent with the lower level of 
uncertainty surrounding the pension expense component compared with alternative non-
pension income statement items. This finding appears to provide indirect justification for 
                                                 
27 The prior literature documents a positive relationship between service cost and stock prices (Barth et al., 
1992), suggesting that service cost is also proxying for omitted human capital variables. Consistent with 
Subramanyam and Zhang (2001) and Hann et al., (2007a), we include the number of employees and 
research and development expense as control variables. Subramanyan and Zhang (2001) assert that service 
cost might reflect the value created by the workforce. Including the number of employees and research and 
development expense as control variables is intended to correct the unexpected positive relationship 
between service cost and stock prices. The number of employees captures the size of the workforce, while 
research and development expense captures the value created by employees. Even though service cost is not 
included as a separate variable in Eqs. (1) and (2), it is nevertheless included in the computation of net 
pension expense and hence we include the aforementioned control variables to enhance model specification. 
This is also consistent with the prior literature (Hann et al., 2007a). Replicating the analysis after excluding 
these two control variables results in a positive and insignificant service cost coefficient.  
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the FASB’s decision to require firms to use the expected return on pension plan assets 
when computing pension expense. We address this issue in the next sub-section. 
When compared with the NETCOST Method pension expense, the results show 
that the smoothed pension expense reported under the GAAP Method is more 
economically and statistically significant, reflecting the lower risk and higher 
predictability of the smoothed pension expense measure. Additionally, the coefficient on 
the NETCOST Method pension expense is lower than that of income before pension 
expense. Acknowledging that the NETCOST Method interest cost includes a string of zero 
values (no interest cost is charged against income if the actual return on pension plan 
covers the interest cost), we delete firm-year observations with zero NETCOST Method 
interest cost values and the coefficient on pension expense is then insignificant. Indeed, 
these findings are consistent with the view that a smoothed pension expense is likely to 
reflect long-term pension costs more accurately. Moreover, the consideration of actual 
market returns when determining the interest cost charge under the NETCOST Method 
contributes to the volatility inherent in the NETCOST Method pension expense measure, 
something which is signified by the larger standard deviation of the NETCOST pension 
expense (0.39) compared to the standard deviation of GAAP pension expense (0.29), 
reducing its persistence (Table 2). In addition, this finding raises possible questions about 
the exclusion of pension earnings from the NETCOST Method computation of pension 
expense. This issue is further examined in the next sub-section when pension expense is 
decomposed into its various components. 
Finally, the coefficients on book value of equity before net pension assets and net 
pension assets are consistent with expectations for all model specifications. Like the 
aggregate specification, the control variables – number of employees and research and 
development expense – are, as expected, positively signed and statistically significant. 
 
5.3 OLS Disaggregated Pension Expense Component Regressions 
Table 5 presents the results of the disaggregated pension expense component 
regressions. This allows an examination of the multiples assigned to alternative pension 
cost components as well as a comparison of the multiples assigned to pension and non-
pension components. The pension cost components pertinent to the GAAP Method – the 
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service cost, interest cost, and other pension costs – are, according to expectations, all 
negatively signed and statistically significant.  
The interest cost coefficient is larger in absolute value than net income before 
pension expense, which is indicative of the low risk or uncertainty surrounding the 
interest cost component of pension expense when compared to the more risky 
components included in income before pension expense. This is consistent with Barth et 
al., (1993) who note that investors seem to apply a debt rate rather than an equity discount 
rate to the interest cost. The coefficient on other pension costs is similar in magnitude to 
the service cost coefficient, reflecting the relative predictability of the amortization 
components (which are included in other pension costs). This is consistent with the ease 
of forecasting this component using information available in the pension footnote. The 
fact that unrecognized actuarial gains (losses) are amortized only when they exceed the 
10% of the fair value of pension plan assets or projected benefit obligations ensures that 
other pension costs do not include transitory components and they are therefore valued by 
the market. This finding contrasts with that reported by Barth et al., (1993) who find that 
the amortization component of pension expense is not significantly different from zero. 
These divergent findings can be explained by the fact that the sample period studied by 
Barth et al., (1993) covered the early years following the adoption of SFAS No. 87. The 
amortization variable used by Barth et al., (1993) therefore mainly includes the 
amortization of the excess of plan assets over plan obligations at the time SFAS No. 87 
was adopted, a variable which Barth et al., (1993) argue might be measured with error. In 
contrast, the other pension cost variable used in our study includes the amortization of 
unrecognized prior service cost, the amortization of unrecognized assets/liabilities, the 
changes in the projected benefit obligation and gains or losses. The market appears to 
regard this information as value relevant.  
The relationship with expected return on pension plan assets is, according to 
expectations, positive and statistically significant with a larger coefficient than net income 
before pension expense. This finding may be attributed to the lower risk assigned to the 
expected return on pension plan assets which, according to SFAS Nos. 87 and 132, is 
based on the expected long-term rate of return and a smoothed or fair net pension asset 
value. In addition, the larger coefficient reflects the higher predictability and persistence 
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of the expected return on plan assets which is based on a long-term assumption, a result 
which justifies the FASB’s position. The positive coefficient on expected return on 
pension plan assets suggests that the market regards returns on the pension fund portfolio 
as corporate funds and hence their inclusion in the calculation of pension expense is 
warranted. Finally, the coefficient on book value of equity before net pension assets, net 
pension assets and the control variables are correctly signed and statistically significant.  
The next columns in Table 5 present the results of the alternative fair value 
specifications. The coefficients on service cost and interest cost are higher compared to 
income before pension expense, consistent with the GAAP Method with the exception of 
the coefficient on interest cost included in FV2 which is unexpectedly positive. Consistent 
with our expectations and reflecting their transitory nature (Ohlson, 1995), the 
coefficients on fair value other pension costs included in FV1 and on the actual return on 
pension plan assets included in FV2 are not statistically distinguishable from zero. More 
importantly, when the actual return is disaggregated into its expected and unexpected 
components, the findings suggest that the market also perceives the unexpected return to 
be relevant (FV3). Additionally, including the unexpected return appears to increase the 
magnitude of the expected return coefficient. The coefficient on net fair value other 
pension costs is negative and significant suggesting that differences between actuarial 
assumptions and actual experience are relevant. Overall, the results suggest that 
distinguishing between permanent and transitory pension expense components may be 
worthwhile in a fair value framework. All the other variables are consistent with 
expectations.28 
Both net income before pension expense and service cost under the NETCOST 
Method are correctly signed and statistically significant, consistent with expectations. 
However, interest cost is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the market does not 
behave as if the NETCOST Method net interest cost measure is value relevant, and that 
the weak significance of the NETCOST Method pension cost reported in Table 4, Panel B, 
is largely driven by the permanent service cost component. The results are very similar 
when deleting zero interest cost values (final column). All the other variables are 
                                                 
28 The coefficient on the fair value of net pension assets is not significant under FV1, contrary to 
expectations. Including an interaction variable equal to FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM, results in a positive 
and significant FAIRNPA coefficient. 
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consistent with expectations. Taken together, the results appear to suggest that the 
aggregation of permanent and transitory components in the computation of pension costs 
reduces the value relevance of reported numbers (FV1, FV2 and NETCOST Methods). 
As a more powerful method of evaluating the NETCOST Method measure of 
pension expense, we estimate Eq. (9). This specification not only allows us to evaluate 
the NETCOST Method pension expense but also the information excluded from the 
NETCOST Method pension expense measure. The coefficient on the interaction variable, 
(INTCOST-$ACTUAL_RETURN)*FIN_DUM, is significant indicating that the NETCOST 
Method potentially omits value relevant information from the computation of pension 
cost. More specifically, the asymmetric treatment of financing costs does not appear to be 
appropriate since the (incremental) excess of the actual return over the interest cost 
appears to be significant (Table 6). Finally, we estimate Eq. (10), which captures the 
potentially different valuation effects of the various pension cost components conditioned 
on whether the interest cost is greater or less than the actual return on plan assets. The 
results show that the unexpected return on plan assets excluded from the NETCOST 
Method is relevant (Table 6). 
Overall, the empirical findings are consistent with the notion that even though the 
calculation   and   recognition   of   pension   expense   as  currently  mandated  under  
SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 (GAAP Method) enhances the value relevance of financial 
statement numbers, the unexpected return on plan assets, which is not currently 
recognized in pension expense, is relevant. Nevertheless, pension expense components 
calculated under the fair value framework appear to impair the value relevance of the 
income statement unless permanent pension expense components are distinguished from 
the transitory ones. Additionally, the market does not appear to behave as if the 
NETCOST interest cost computation is relevant while the information excluded from the 
NETCOST pension expense measure, namely the excess of actual pension asset returns 
over the interest cost, appears to be informative.   
 
5.4 Does a Pension Plan’s Funding Status Really Matter? 
A defined benefit pension plan is regarded as fully funded when the pension assets 
are adequate to meet the pension obligations. ERISA stipulates a complex set of rules that 
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govern funding requirements for defined benefit plans which oblige plan sponsors to 
make additional contributions if funding levels fall below a threshold.29 Despite the 
proliferation of overfunded plans in the 1990s, the US stock market crash in the early 
2000 and low interest rates have recently contributed to the underfunding levels witnessed 
by many US defined benefit pension plans. Indeed, sample yearly descriptive statistics 
show that the defined benefit plans included in the sample used in the empirical analysis 
were consistently underfunded post-2000 (Table 7, Panel A, Figure 1). The underfunding 
levels of the weakest US plans reached $353.7 billion at the end of 2004 and in 2005 
United Airlines terminated its heavily underfunded plan (Gallagher, 2005; Kirchoff et al., 
2005). Coca Cola Co’s defined benefit pension plans were on aggregate underfunded by 
$414 million in 2002 (Faherty, 2002) and Ford Motor Corp’s plan was underfunded by 
$7.3 billion in the same year (Anonymous, 2003b). High profile pension plan 
terminations and the underfunding levels witnessed by many US defined benefit plans 
have led various market commentators to speculate about a looming pension fund crisis. 
The previous literature has not considered the impact of funding levels on the valuation 
implications of pension expense (Barth et al., 1992, 1993; Coronado and Sharpe, 2003; 
Coronado et al., 2006; Hann et al., 2007a). Motivated by the unprecedented attention paid 
to the underfunding levels of US pension plans in the finance literature (for example 
Cooper and Ross, 2002), we examine whether investors value the pension cost of 
underfunded versus overfunded plans differently. 
A plan is considered overfunded if the fair value of pension plan assets exceeds 
the projected benefit obligations and underfunded if the projected benefit obligations 
exceed the fair value of pension plan assets. Table 7, Panel B, presents descriptive 
statistics for each sub-sample. As expected, pension plan assets are on average lower than 
pension liabilities for the sub-sample of firms sponsoring underfunded plans, and the 
smoothed net pension asset recognized in the balance sheet is lower for those plans 
compared to the overfunded group. Firms with overfunded pension plans on average 
report pension income rather than pension expense under GAAP and the average 
expected return on pension plan assets is very similar to actual returns, suggesting that 
                                                 
29 Plan sponsors are required to make additional contributions if the funding ratio falls below 80% or 90%: 
ERISA rules allow firms 3 to 5 years and 7 years to attain the 80% and 90% thresholds respectively. 
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pension income is unlikely to be the result of overoptimistic expected rates of return on 
pension plan assets. This result should, however, be cautiously interpreted because the 
median expected return on assets is greater than the actual. Interestingly, while firms with 
underfunded plans on average report pension expense under the GAAP Method, the 
expected return on pension plan assets is greater than the actual – which is indicative of 
underfunded plans using overoptimistic expected rates of return when computing pension 
expense. Finally, profitability and leverage ratios are similar for the two groups of firms. 
We employ a pooled disaggregated pension expense regression with an interaction 
variable designed to capture the incremental valuation effects pertinent to overfunded 
plans (PENSEXP*SURPLUS_DUM).  The results presented in Table 8 suggest that the 
market assigns a higher multiple to the GAAP pension expense of underfunded plans 
(GAAP Underfunded coef., p-value: -11.52, 0.00, Overfunded coef., p-value: -4.54, 0.05). 
On the contrary, pension expense under the NETCOST Method is insignificant for 
underfunded plans. Excluding zero NETCOST Method interest cost values results in an 
insignificant pension cost coefficient for overfunded plans as well. Untabulated results 
from pooled disaggregated pension expense component regressions reinforce the 
aforementioned findings. More specifically, GAAP pension expense components are 
more significant for underfunded than overfunded plans. In fact, OTHER_COST is not 
significant for overfunded plans. Interestingly, the NETCOST Method interest cost 
component of pension expense is insignificant for both underfunded and overfunded 
plans, reinforcing the findings reported in Table 5. 
 
5.5 Jack-knife Regressions 
The results discussed in the previous sections mainly pertain to the in-sample 
evaluation of the multiples assigned to various pension expense measures as well as to 
alternative pension expense components. This sub-section complements the analysis 
above by addressing an overriding question: Which model has the greatest predictive 
value? We address this question using jack-knife out-of-sample regressions introduced by 
Quenouille (1956) according to which the information in the sample is recycled to obtain 
the sampling distributions of the required statistics (Maddala, 2001). Jack-knife 
regression models are built for each pension expense accounting method and out-of-
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sample equity market value predictions are sought for each firm after excluding the 
observation in question.  
We estimate 3,388 jack-knife regressions for each accounting method. Following 
Landsman et al., (2006) and Barth et al., (2005), we set any equity market values that are 
predicted to be negative equal to zero. The prediction errors generated are used to 
compute the absolute percentage error metric (AE): 
 
                    ( ) ktktkt MVEMVEPREDMVEabsAE /_−=  
 
where  is the predicted market value of equity for firm k in year t obtained 
after excluding that firm-year observation. We subsequently rank each method based on 
the AE for each observation in the sample by assigning a value of 1 to the method with 
the lowest AE, 2 to the method with the next higher AE, etc. We then count how many 
times each pension cost accounting method comes first, i.e. has a ranking of 1.  
ktMVEPRED _
The analysis is conducted by comparing the alternative methods using the 
aggregate regressions, disaggregated pension expense regressions and disaggregated 
pension expense component regressions. Table 9, Panel A, presents the findings for the 
aggregate jack-knife regressions, Panel B, for the disaggregated pension expense jack-
knife regressions and Panel C, for the disaggregated pension expense component jack-
knife regressions.30 The GAAP Method is the one that generates the lowest AE most of 
the times for both the aggregate and the disaggregated pension expense regressions. The 
GAAP Method also generates the lowest AE when compared to the NETCOST Method 
using disaggregated pension expense component regressions. When comparing the three 
alternative fair value models, at first sight FV2 including the actual return on plan assets 
appears to generate the lowest AE, even though marginally. More importantly however, 
when assessing the cumulative percent of each method terminating first or second in 
terms of the lowest AE, FV3 generally does best. Overall, the findings from the jack-knife 
regression procedure appear to suggest that while GAAP Method pension expense 
                                                 
30 It is not possible to compare all the models simultaneously because of the different number of 
observations available to estimate each model. 
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components are relevant, the unexpected return included in FV3 is also informative, 
hence confirming the OLS findings. 
 
6 Sensitivity Analysis 
A battery of sensitivity checks were conducted to ensure the robustness of the 
main findings. The reported findings pertain to the 1998 to 2005 period. Because S&P 
introduced S&P Core Earnings in May 2002 it is conceivable that the market started 
taking account of this alternative measure of pension expense only in 2002, even though 
the information necessary to compute it was previously available in the pension footnote. 
If this is the case, we would expect the NETCOST Method pension expense measure to be 
more value relevant post-2002 and the interest cost component to be significant. We run 
the NETCOST Method regressions using firm-year observations from 2002 onwards and 
find no evidence to suggest this is the case. 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors following White (1980) have been 
reported in the main analysis. The unbiasedness of the reported White standard errors, 
however, rests on the residuals being independent and identically distributed. Because of 
the employment of a panel data set in this study (observations on multiple firms across 
time), it is likely that the residuals are correlated across observations at the firm level and 
this would lead to White standard errors being biased (Petersen, 2007). To account for 
within-cluster dependence, We compute firm-clustered errors and the untabulated results 
are broadly similar.  
Heteroscedasticity issues constitute one of the major shortcomings of price level 
models (Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995) and the choice of deflators may affect the 
inferences drawn (Ye, 2005). Reported findings use the number of shares outstanding 
adjusted for stock splits and dividends as a deflator. The findings are robust to alternative 
deflators. 
In evaluating the association between market equity values and alternative pension 
expense measures, we compute market value of equity at fiscal year-end consistent with 
prior studies (Barth et al., 1992; Collins and Kothari, 1989). Detailed pension cost 
information is, however, only available in the notes to the financial statements. As a 
sensitivity check, we estimate the main regressions using the market value of equity three 
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months after the fiscal year-end to ensure that pension cost information is impounded in 
market equity values. Untabulated findings are similar to those reported. 
 
7 Conclusion 
This study has examined the value relevance of alternative measures of pension 
expense by employing an adaptation of the cross-sectional valuation model originally 
used by Landsman (1986) which distinguishes between the operating and financial 
activities of the firm, and which we have revised to include earnings following Ohlson 
(1995). The main focus was on examining how the market prices pension cost accruals by 
comparing pension cost as currently reported under SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 and the 
proposed NETCOST Method alternative. In addition, we examined the association 
between the market value of equity and the disaggregated pension expense components of 
GAAP and NETCOST pension expense, as well as three alternative fair value pension 
expense measures. Research on the value relevance of alternative pension expense 
measures to be included in the income statement is important in light of the impact that 
pension expense has on firm profitability. In addition, such a study is timely in view of 
the FASB’s project to overhaul pension accounting, the second phase of which focuses on 
the income statement and the smoothing provisions embedded in SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 
(FASB, 2006a, 2006b).  
The empirical analysis showed that pension expense as currently reported under 
SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 better captured the market’s aggregate valuation of pension costs 
as signified by the economically higher pension expense coefficient when compared to 
the NETCOST Method. When pension cost was disaggregated into its individual 
components, the alternative GAAP pension expense components were significant while 
the unexpected return on pension plan assets included in FV3 was also significant, 
suggesting that the market perceives this component to be relevant. In contrast, the 
insignificance of NETCOST Method interest cost suggests that the market behaves as if 
the interest cost component of the NETCOST Method pension cost is not relevant. 
Additionally, fair value pension expense measures, which aggregate permanent with 
transitory components, appear to impair the value relevance of income statement 
numbers. The out-of-sample jack-knife regressions confirmed the OLS findings in that 
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the GAAP Method and the fair value specification including the unexpected return are 
more likely to provide the most accurate estimates of equity value. In view of the severe 
underfunding experienced by defined benefit pension plans in recent years, we examined 
the potentially different valuation effects associated with underfunded versus overfunded 
plans. The results show that pension expense is more relevant for underfunded plans. 
Overall, the results suggest that retaining existing pension expense recognition 
requirements and mandating firms to recognize the unexpected return on plan assets along 
with the expected return is likely to provide an accurate description of perceived pension 
costs while also distinguishing between permanent and transitory pension cost 
components. The results are important in the context of the FASB’s current review of the 
smoothing provisions of SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 as well as developments in the 
international arena.    
The conclusions reached should, however, be interpreted cautiously bearing in 
mind that firms are currently required to report pension costs under SFAS Nos. 87 and 
132. The empirical tests cannot capture the valuation effects on contemporaneous stock 
prices if any of the alternative methods of pension cost computation were mandated 
because enforcement of one of these would be likely to affect managerial actions. The 
finding that the market appears to behave as if the NETCOST Method interest cost 
component is not relevant should also be interpreted carefully as the primary interest of 
S&P, who originally suggested this alternative pension cost computation, is in measuring 
default rather than the valuation of equity. Future research can examine the credit 










   
References 
 
Alix, S. (2005). Death to smoothing. CFO Magazine, February 22. 
 
Amir, E. (1993). The market valuation implications of accounting information: The case of 
postretirement benefits other than pensions. The Accounting Review, 68(4), 703-724. 
 
Amir, E. (1996). The effect of accounting aggregation on the value-relevance of financial 
disclosures: The case of SFAS No. 106. The Accounting Review, 71(4), 573-590. 
 
Amir, E., & Benartzi, S. (1997). Reported income and the expected rate of return on 
pension assets. Journal of Financial Statement Analysis, 2(2), 17-25. 
 
Amlie, T. T. (2004). Employee benefit plans: Finding the true cost of pension plans. Retrieved 
20/10/2006, from http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/104/text/p44.htm. 
 
Anonymous. (2003a). Inside S&P's new core earnings. Retrieved 03/11/2006, from 
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/may2002/pi20020514_4676.htm?chan=search. 
 
Anonymous. (2003b). Ford's pension underfunding hit $7.3 billion in 2002. Retrieved 
20/12/2006, 2006, from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UDO/is_8_16/ai_96575336. 
 
Asthana, S. (2001). The impact of regulatory and audit environment on managers' 
discretionary accounting choices: The case of SFAS No. 106. Accounting and the Public 
Interest, 1(1), 73-96. 
 
Barth, M. E. (1991). Relative measurement errors among alternative pension asset and liability 
measures. The Accounting Review, 66(3), 433-463. 
 
Barth, M. E., Beaver, W. H., & Landsman, W. R. (1992). The market valuation implications of 
net periodic pension cost components. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15(1), 27-62. 
 
Barth, M. E., Beaver, W. H., & Landsman, W. R. (1993). A structural analysis of pension 
disclosures under SFAS 87 and their relation to share prices. Financial Analysts Journal, 49(1), 
18-26. 
 
Barth, M. E., Beaver, W. H., Hand, J. M., & Landsman, W. R. (2005). Accruals, accounting-
based valuation models, and the prediction of equity values. Journal of Accounting, Auditing 
and Finance, 20(4), 311-345. 
 
Bergstresser, D., Desai, M. A., & Rauh, J. D. (2006). Earnings manipulation, pension 
assumptions and managerial investment decisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1), 
157-195. 
 




   
Blitzer, M. D., Friedman, E. R., & Silverblatt, J. H. (2002). Measures of corporate earnings. 
New York: Standard & Poor's. 
 
Brown, S. (2004). The impact of pension assumptions on firm value. Working Paper, 
Emory University. 
 
Bryan-Low, C. (2003). Pension shortfalls force companies to make choices-At an 
increasing rate, cash for growth is used to boost sagging funds. The Wall Street Journal, 
April 17, C3. 
 
Buffett, W., & Loomis, C. (2001). Warren Buffett on the stock market. Retrieved 01/02/2007, 
from http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2001/12/10/314691/index.htm. 
 
Byrnes, N., & Welsch, D. (2006). Retiree accounting: More than meets the eye. Retrieved 
20/12/2006, from http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_05/b3969080.htm. 
 
Chadwick, R. E. (1986). FAS 87-What it means for business. Management Accounting, 
67(9), 20-25. 
 
Choi, B., Collins, D. W., & Johnson, B. W. (1997). Valuation implications of reliability 
differences: The case of nonpension postretirement obligations. The Accounting Review, 72(3), 
351-383. 
 
Ciesielski, J. T. (2001). Pondering pensions: The face of shmoo. The Analysts Accounting 
Observer, 11(7&8). 
 
Collins, D. W., & Kothari, S. P. (1989). An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional 
determinants of earnings response coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
11(2&3), 143-181. 
 
Cooper, S., Deng, Z., & Jullens, D. (2007). Financial reporting for investors. London: 
UBS. 
 
Cooper, R. W., & Ross, T. W. (2002). Pensions: Theories of underfunding. Labour 
Economics, 8(6), 667-689. 
 
Coronado, J., Sharpe, S., Mitchell, S. O., & Nesbitt, B. (2006). Footnotes aren't enough: 
The impact of pension accounting on stock values. Pension Research Council Working 
Paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Coronado, J. L., & Sharpe, S. A. (2003). Did pension plan accounting contribute to a stock 
market bubble? Brookings Papers of Economic Activity, 1, 323-371. 
 




   
Daley, L. A. (1984). The valuation of reported pension measures for firms sponsoring defined 
benefit plans. The Accounting Review, 59(2), 177-198. 
 
Davis-Friday, P. Y., Folami, B. L., Liu, C. S., & Mittelstaedt, F. H. (1999). The value 
relevance of financial statement recognition vs. disclosure: Evidence from SFAS No. 106. 
The Accounting Review, 74(4), 403-423. 
 
Davis-Friday, P. Y., Liu, C. S., & Mittelstaedt, F. H. (2004). Recognition and disclosure 
reliability: Evidence from SFAS No. 106. Contemporary Accounting Research, 21(2), 
399-429. 
 
Deloitte. (2006). FEI's top 10 financial reporting issues for 2006. Deloitte Development 
LLC. 
 
Espahbodi, H., Strock, E., & Tehranian, H. (1991). Impact on equity prices of 
pronouncements related to nonpension postretirement benefits. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 14(4), 323-346. 
 
Faherty, T. (2002). Employee Benefits. Retrieved 18/10/2006, from http://www.illinoisbar.org/. 
 
FASB. (1985). Statement of financial accounting standards No. 87: Employers’ 
accounting for pensions. Stamford, Connecticut: FASB. 
 
FASB. (1998). Statement of financial accounting standards No. 132: Employers' 
disclosures about pensions and other postretirement benefits-An amendment of FASB 
statements No. 87, 88, and 106. Norwalk, Connecticut: FASB. 
 
FASB. (2003). Statement of financial accounting standards No. 132 (revised 2003): 
Employers' disclosures about pensions and other postretirement benefits-An amendment 
of FASB statements No. 87, 88, and 106. Norwalk, Connecticut: FASB. 
 
FASB. (2006a). Statement of financial accounting standards No. 158: Employer's 
accounting for defined benefit pension and other postretirement plans-An amendment of 
FASB statements No. 87, 88, 106. and 132(R). Norwalk, Connecticut: FASB. 
 
FASB. (2006b). FASB User Advisory Council. Norwalk, Connecticut: FASB. 
 
FEI. (2002). FEI questions relevance of new S&P core earnings measure; Endorses 
further work by S&P with the FASB and other parties. Retrieved 02/01/2007, from 
http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=163. 
 
Feldstein, M., & Morck, R. (1983). Pension funds and the value of equities. Financial 
Analysts Journal, September/October, 29-39. 
 
Feldstein, M., & Seligman, S. (1981). Pension funding, share prices, and national savings. 
The Journal of Finance, 36(4), 801-824. 
 
 35
   
Fore, D. (2004). Changes in accounting practices will drive pension paradigm shift. 
Pension Research Council Working Paper, The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
Fortune, P. (2005). Pension accounting and corporate earnings: The world according to 
GAAP. Public Policy Discussion Papers No. 06-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
 





Gerson Lehrman. (2006). Pension accounting: Current challenges and beyond. United 
Kingdom: Gerson Lehrman Group. 
 
Goff, J., & Reason, T. (2002). But can it core a annual?  Retrieved 19/10/2006, from 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3004688. 
 
Gold, J. (2005). Accounting/Actuarial bias enables equity investment by defined benefit 
pension plans. North American Actuarial Journal, 9(3), 1-21. 
 
Gopalakrishnan, V., & Sugrue, F. T. (1993). An empirical investigation of stock market 
valuation of corporate projected pension liabilities. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 20(5), 711-724. 
 
Hann, R., Heflin, F., & Subramanyam, K. R. (2007a). Fair-value pension accounting. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Forthcoming. 
 
Hann, R., Lu, Y., & Subramanyam, K. R. (2007b). Uniformity vs. Flexibility: Evidence 
from Pricing of the Pension Obligation. The Accounting Review, 82(1), 107-137. 
 
Henry, D. (2001). Why Earnings Are Too Rosy. Retrieved 07/04/2007, from 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_33/b3745102.htm. 
 
Henry, D., Arndt, M., & Brady, D. (2002). The pension bomb. Retrieved 07/04/2007, 
from http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_07/b3770096.htm. 
 
House of Representatives Report (1999). House Report 106-478-Ticket to work and work 
incentives improvement Act 1999. Retrieved 20/12/2006, 2006, from 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:h.r.01180:. 
 
Jagannathan, V. (2002). S&P to focus on Core Earnings for analysis. Retrieved 19/10/2006, 
from http://www.domainb.com/finance/ratomg/standard_poor/20020517_core_earnings.html.  
 
Jones, C. P., & Walker, M. D. (2003). Pension assets, corporate earnings, and expected 
return assumptions. Journal of Investing, 12(2), 25-32. 
 
 36
   
Katz, D. M. (2002). Defined benefits, loose accounting. CFO Magazine, May 20. 
 
Katz, D. M. (2006a). Put pension status on the balance sheet. CFO Magazine, March 31. 
 
Katz, D. M. (2006b). Q&A: Pensions on the brink. CFO Magazine, April 04. 
 
Katz, D. M. (2006c). FASB employers clash on pension metric. Retrieved 18/10/2006, 
from http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7108726/c_7146188. 
 
Kemp, R. S. (1985). Funding pension liabilities: Employee versus firm perspectives.           
Broader Perspectives on the Interest of Pension Plan Participants, (6), 31-38. 
 
Khurana, I. K., & Loudder, M. L. (1994). The economic consequences of SFAS 106 in 
rate-regulated enterprises. The Accounting Review, 69(2), 364-380. 
 




Klumpes, P. J. M. (2001). Implications of four theoretical perspectives for pension accounting 
research. Journal of Accounting Literature, 20, 30-61. 
 
Kothari, S. P., & Zimmerman, J. (1995). Price and return models. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 20(2), 155-192. 
 
Kwan, S. (2003). Pension accounting and reported earnings. FRBSF Economic Letter, 
Number 2003-19. 
 
Landsman, W. R. (1986). An empirical investigation of pension fund property rights. The 
Accounting Review, 61(4), 662-691. 
 
Landsman, W. R., & Ohlson, J. A. (1990). Evaluation of market efficiency for supplementary 
accounting disclosures: The case of pension assets and liabilities. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 7(1), 185-198. 
 
Landsman, W. R., Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Yeh, S. (2006). Which approach to 
accounting for employee stock options best reflects market pricing. Review of Accounting 
Studies, 11(2-3), 203-245. 
 
Liebana, P. L., & Vincent, L. (2004). Financial reporting for defined benefit pension 
plans. Working paper, Northwestern University. 
 
Maddala, G. S. (2001). Introduction to econometrics. Chichester: John Wiley&Sons. 
 
Milliman Consultants and Actuaries. (2006). Milliman 2006 pension study, US: Milliman. 
 
 37
   
Mittelstaedt, F. H., & Warshawsky, M. J. (1993). The impact of liabilities for retiree 
health benefits on share prices. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 60(1), 13-35. 
 
Moran, M., & Cohen, A. J. (2005). Pension accounting: FASB finally moving forward. 
The Goldman and Sachs Group Inc. 
 
Nashwa, G. (2003). The impact of pension accounting on companies' financial statements. 
Retrieved 10/01/2007, February, from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0OGT/is_2_1/ai_113563613/pg_2. 
 
Norris, F. (2001). Guaranteed profits: The fiction of pension accounting. New York Times, 
December 7, 1-2. 
 
Ohlson, J. A. (1995). Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 11(2), 661-688. 
 
Petersen, M. A. (2007). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches. Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming. 
 
Picconi, M. (2006). The perils of pensions: Does pension accounting lead investors and 
analysts astray? The Accounting Review, 81(4), 925-955. 
 
Pulliam, S. (1993). Aggressive rate assumptions put pension funds at risk. The Wall Street 
Journal, March 25, C1. 
 
Quenouille, M. (1956). Notes on bias in estimation. Biometrika, 43 (3&4), 353-360. 
 
Revsine, L., Collins, D. W., & Johnson, B. W. (2005). Financial reporting and analysis (3rd 
ed.). NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Schultz, E. E., & Francis, T. (2003). For pension plans, risky is fine; accounting rules let 
companies benefit from investment upside, escape consequences of mistakes. The Wall 
Street Journal, December 10. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (2003). Summary by the division of 
corporation finance of significant issues addressed in the review of the periodic reports of 
the Fortune 500 companies. Retrieved 11/04/2007, from 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm. 
 
Shaw, H. (2005). FASB's Herz opposes pension smoothing. CFO Magazine, November 
21. 
 
Standard & Poor's. (2002a). Standard & Poor's core earnings market review. Retrieved 
10/06/2005, from http://www.businessweek.com/pdfs/2002/spcore.pdf. 
 
 38
   




Standard & Poor's. (2002c). Pensions, pension interest and Standard & Poor's core earnings. 
Retrieved 10/06/2005, from 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/CoreEarningsPensions.pdf. 
 
Subramanyam, K. R., & Zhang, Y. (2001). Does stock price reflect future service effects not 
included in the projected benefit obligation as defined in SFAS 87 and SFAS 132? Working 
paper, University of Southern California and Columbia University. 
 
Welsh, J. M. (1991). Excess pension assets as corporate assets: an unresolved issue. Retrieved 
03/01/2007, from http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/09387206.htm. 
 
White, G. I., Sondhi, A. C., & Fried, D. (2003). The analysis and use of financial statements. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
White, H. (1980). A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
of heteroscedasticity. Econometrica, 48, 817-838. 
 
Wiedman, C. I., & Weir, H. (2005). Pension accounting: The end of smoothing? IVEY Business 
Journal, March/April, 1-8. 
 
Wiedman, C. I., & Wier, H. (2004). The market valuation implications of post-retirement 
benefit plans and plan surpluses-Canadian evidence. Canadian Journal of Administrative 
Sciences, 21(3), 229-241. 
 
Wiedman, C., & Goldberg, D. (2002). Pension accounting coming to light in a bear market. 
IVEY Business Journal, May/June. 
 
Wozniak, D. A., & Chittim, B. D. (2006). FASB pension accounting overhaul begins. 
Retrieved 02/01/2007, from 
www.melloninstitutional.com/public/library/documents/knowledge/pdfs/FASB.pdf. 
 
Ye, J. (2005). Price models and the value relevance of accounting information. Working paper, 
Baruch College. 
 
Yoon, L. (2005). Pensions go on the balance sheet: FASB. CFO Magazine, November 14. 
 








   
Appendix 1 CTS Corp. Pension Footnote 
 
Defined Benefit and Other Postretirement Benefit Plans  
 
CTS has a number of noncontributory defined benefit pension plans (Pension Plans) 
covering approximately 23% of its employees. Plans covering salaried employees provide 
pension benefits that are based on the employees' compensation prior to retirement. Plans 
covering hourly employees generally provide benefits of stated amounts for each year of 
service. CTS provides postretirement life insurance benefits for certain retired employees. 
Domestic employees who were hired prior to 1982 and certain domestic union employees 
are eligible for life insurance benefits upon retirement. CTS funds life insurance benefits 
through term life insurance policies and intends to continue funding all of the premiums 
on a pay-as-you-go basis. The measurement date for the majority of the Pension Plans 
and other postretirement plan assets and benefit obligations was December 31, 2005 and 
2004. The following table provides a reconciliation of benefit obligation, plan assets, and 
the funded status of the Pension Plans and other postretirement benefit plan at that 
measurement date.  
                                      Pension Plans       Other Postretirement  
                                                        Benefit Plan  
($ in thousands)                         2005      2004            2005      2004  
Accumulated benefit obligation      $ 197,411 $ 185,302         $ 5,145   $ 5,433  
Change in projected benefit  
obligation:  
    Projected benefit obligation at     $ 196,492 $ 186,950         $ 5,433   $ 5,100  
January 1  
Service cost                            5,236     5,292              29        31  
Interest cost                          11,338    11,265             318       309  
(1) Plan amendment and other                (850)       954            R12;      R12;  
(2) Actuarial (gain) loss                   6,616     1,231           (485)       140  
Benefits paid                         (9,754)   (9,200)           (150)     (147)  
Curtailment                             (499)      R12;            
(3) Projected benefit obligation at     $ 208,579 $ 196,492         $ 5,145   $ 5,433  
December 31  
Change in plan assets:  
Assets at fair value at January 1   $ 276,991 $ 259,764            
(4) Actual return on assets                 8,688    24,364         
Company contributions                   1,713     1,550             149       147  
Benefits paid                         (9,754)   (9,200)            (149)     (147)  
Other                                   (603)       513          
(5) Assets at fair value at December 31 $ 277,035 $ 276,991         
Reconciliation of prepaid (accrued)  
cost:  
Funded status (plan assets less      $ 68,456  $ 80,499       $ (5,145) $ (5,433)  
projected benefit obligations)  
Amounts not recognized:  
Actuarial (gains) losses               75,468    53,689            (62)       423  
Prior service cost                      3,857     5,157               3         5  
Transition asset                         R12;     (304)          
(6) Prepaid (accrued) cost, net         $ 147,781 $ 139,041       $ (5,204) $ (5,005)  
 
The components of the prepaid (accrued) cost, net are classified in the following lines in 
the Consolidated Balance Sheets:  
   
  
                                     Pension Plans       Other Postretirement  
                                                         Benefit Plan  
($ in thousands)                          2005      2004            2005      2004  
Prepaid pension asset                $ 152,483 $ 143,918          
Other accrued liabilities              (1,156)   (1,645)           (150)     (150)  
Other long-term obligations            (7,648)   (6,073)         (5,054)   (4,855)  
Accumulated other comprehensive loss     4,102     2,841           
                                     $ 147,781 $ 139,041       $ (5,204) $ (5,005)  
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The projected benefit obligation, accumulated benefit obligation and fair value of plan 
assets for those Pension Plans with accumulated benefit obligation in excess of fair value 




($ in thousands)                   2005     2004  
Projected benefit obligation   $ 17,830 $ 15,639  
Accumulated benefit obligation   16,502   14,123  
Fair value of plan assets         7,698    6,405  
   
 
Net pension (income)/postretirement expense in 2005, 2004, and 2003 includes the 
following components:  
  
  
                      Pension Plans                  Other Postretirement  
                                                     Benefit Plan  
($ in thousands)           2005      2004       2003           2005  2004  2003  
(7) Service cost            $ 5,236   $ 5,292    $ 4,916           $ 29  $ 31  $ 39  
(8) Interest cost            11,338    11,265     10,910            318   310   317  
(9) Expected return on     (25,661)  (27,051)   (26,924)            
plan assets 1  
 (10) Amortization of  
unrecognized:  
Transition obligation     (304)     (492)      (564)            
Prior service cost          799      901        883        
Recognized (gain)         1,125      658       (936)            
loss  
Curtailment loss            475           
 (11) Net (income) expense  $ (6,992) $ (9,427) $ (11,715)          $ 347 $ 342 $ 357  
Weighted-average  
actuarial assumptions  
2  
Benefit obligation  
assumptions:  
Discount rate             5.93%     5.94%      6.17%          6.00% 6.00% 6.25%  




expense assumptions:  
Discount rate             5.94%     6.17%      6.67%          6.00% 6.25% 6.75%  
Expected return on        8.45%     8.70%      8.94%            
plan assets   
Rate of compensation      4.83%     4.83%      4.84%         
increase  
   
 
1 Expected return on plan assets is net of expected investment expenses and certain 
administrative expenses.  
 2 During the fourth quarter of each year, CTS reviews its actuarial assumptions in light 
of current economic factors to determine if the assumptions need to be adjusted.  
 
CTS utilizes a building block approach in determining the long-term rate of return for 
plan assets. Historical markets are reviewed and long-term relationships between equities 
and fixed-income are preserved consistent with the generally accepted capital market 
principle that assets with higher volatility generate a greater return over the long term. 
Current market factors such as inflation and interest rates are evaluated before long-term 
capital market assumptions are determined. The long-term portfolio return is established 
via a building block approach with proper consideration of diversification and 
rebalancing. Peer data and historical returns are reviewed to ensure for reasonableness 
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and appropriateness. 29 CTS' pension plan asset allocation at December 31, 2005 and 
2004, and target allocation for 2006 by asset category are as follows:  
   
  
                     Target Allocations Percentage of PlanAssets at December  
                                        31,  
Asset Category                     2006                           2005  2004  
Equity securities ^1                65%                            66%   58%  
Debt securities                     33%                            32%   28%  
Real estate                                              
Other                                2%                             2%    14 %   
Total                              100%                           100%  100%  
   
  
  
1. Equity securities include CTS common stock in the amounts of approximately $16 
million (6% of total plan assets) at December 31, 2005 and approximately $19 million 
(7% of total plan assets) at December 31, 2004.  
2. Included in the December 31, 2004 "Other" asset category is approximately $25 
million of cash. This short-term increase in cash arose as CTS liquidated assets held by a 
few fund managers and transferred the cash to new fund managers at year-end. This 
change in fund managers was made to further diversify the pension asset portfolio, and 
improve overall return on assets by reducing administrative expenses. After December 
31, 2004, the cash was re-invested by the new fund managers and the percentage of assets 
by category was as follows: Equity securities - 65%, Debt securities - 33%, and Other - 
2%.  
 
CTS employs a total return investment approach whereby a mix of equities and fixed 
income investments are used to maximize the long-term return of plan assets for a prudent 
level of risk. Risk tolerance is established through careful consideration of plan liabilities 
and funded status. The investment portfolio primarily contains a diversified mix of equity 
and fixed-income investments. The equity investments are diversified across U.S. and 
non-U.S. stocks, as well as growth, value, and small, and large capitalizations. Other 
assets such as private equity are used modestly to enhance long-term returns while 
improving portfolio diversification. Investment risk is measured and monitored on an 
ongoing basis through quarterly investment portfolio reviews, annual liability 
measurements, and asset/liability studies at regular intervals. The expected contributions 
to be made by CTS to the Pension Plans and the other postretirement benefit plan during 
2006 are $1.2 million and $0.2 million, respectively. Estimated Future Benefit Payments 
The following benefit payments, which reflect expected future service, as appropriate, are 
expected to be paid: 
 
 
($ in thousands)  Pension Plans Other Postretirement Benefit Plans  
             2006       $ 9,799                              $ 362  
             2007        10,479                                371  
             2008        11,691                                378  
             2009        11,676                                382  
             2010        12,402                                385  





   



















Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of the fair value of pension assets and projected benefit obligations 
for the sample firms from 1998 to 2005. It also depicts pension plan funding status defined as the 
































   
Table 1 Sample Selection and Pension Cost Calculation Example 
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure
Selection Criterion Number of Observations
All Compustat firms with non-missing observations 5,155
Less:
         Firms without a DB plan (369)
         Observations where actual is equal to expected return on pension plan assets (186)
         Observations representing SERP plans (147)
         Special cases (50)
Final Sample 4,403
Panel B: CTS Corp. Example 
GAAP Method NETCOST Method FV Method
Pension Cost Components ($ millions)
Service Cost 5.2 5.2 5.2
Interest Cost 11.3 2.6 11.3
Expected Dollar Return on Pension Plan Assets (25.7)
Actual Dollar Return on Pension Plan Assets (8.7)
Amortization of Actuarial Gains or Losses 2.1
Actuarial Losses (Gains) 6.6
Plan Amendments (0.9)
Pension Expense (Income) (7.1) 7.8 13.5  
Notes 
Panel  A  presents  the  sample  selection  procedure  and  Panel  B  illustrates pension expense calculated 



























   
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median Std Dev
MVE 29.07 25.14 17.94
NI 1.59 1.32 1.24
NETCOST NI 1.48 1.24 1.25
ADJNI 1.67 1.38 1.30
GAAP PENSEXP 0.13 0.07 0.29
NETCOST PENSEXP 0.28 0.15 0.39
SERVCOST 0.17 0.11 0.18
INTCOST 0.39 0.19 0.51
ADJINT 0.12 0.00 0.29
OTHER_COST 0.06 0.01 0.16
OTHER_FAIRCOST 0.60 0.14 1.51
$EXP_RETURN 0.48 0.21 0.69
$ACTUAL_RETURN 0.40 0.11 1.07
BVE 11.96 9.91 8.51
BVEADJ 11.63 9.68 8.37
NPA 0.29 0.01 1.54
EMPL 27.80 9.26 48.71
R&D 0.73 0.42 0.93  
Notes 
The table presents sample descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. MVE is the market value of equity 
at fiscal year-end. NI is GAAP net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. 
NETCOST NI is GAAP net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus the after-
tax reported pension expense minus the after-tax NETCOST Method expense. ADJNI is net income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus the after-tax reported pension expense. 
GAAP PENSEXP is pension expense as currently reported under SFAS Nos. 87 and 132. NETCOST 
PENSEXP is defined as service cost plus the excess of interest cost over the actual return on pension plan 
assets. SERVCOST is the service cost. INTCOST is the reported interest cost. ADJINT is the NETCOST 
Method interest cost defined as the excess of interest cost over actual return on pension plan assets. 
OTHER_COST represents all other pension costs associated with defined benefit pension plans that do 
not fall into any of the other categories. OTHER_FAIRCOST is fair value other pension costs including 
the actuarial gains and losses under fair value accounting. $EXP_RETURN is the expected dollar return 
on pension plan assets. $ACTUAL_RETURN is the actual dollar return on pension plan assets. BVE is the 
book value of common equity. BVEADJ is the book value of common equity excluding the recognized 
net pension asset. NPA is the recognized net pension asset. EMPL is the number of employees and R&D 
is research and development expense. All variables, except EMPL, are deflated by the number of 











   
Table 3 GAAP versus NETCOST Pension Expense 
Panel A: GAAP Pension Expense 
Mean Median Std Dev Lower Quartile Upper Quartile 
1998 (N=273) 13.48 3.48 128.70 -0.07 11.74
1999 (N=332) -2.46 2.86 128.09 -0.27 10.78
2000 (N=399) -14.30 0.47 143.49 -2.73 5.29
2001 (N=400) 4.42 0.97 157.73 -0.19 7.27
2002 (N=449) 25.61 2.80 137.67 0.38 13.40
2003 (N=487) 81.05 7.21 322.23 1.74 34.20
2004 (N=557) 81.68 7.95 233.36 1.74 46.18
2005 (N=491) 67.82 9.11 199.35 2.05 42.40
Panel B: NETCOST Pension Expense 
Mean Median Std Dev Lower Quartile Upper Quartile 
1998 (N=273) 52.04 11.90 138.49 3.48 39.00
1999 (N=332) 47.08 10.95 116.87 3.67 37.50
2000 (N=399) 96.14 9.80 399.65 2.88 44.37
2001 (N=400) 112.77 12.37 357.99 2.87 59.45
2002 (N=449) 122.25 15.42 349.49 4.29 66.51
2003 (N=487) 60.15 7.52 166.37 2.17 38.00
2004 (N=557) 61.65 7.33 164.38 1.80 36.86
2005 (N=491) 57.45 7.65 161.66 2.41 37.00  
Notes 
The table presents descriptive statistics of GAAP versus the NETCOST pension expense. Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics of the GAAP pension expense and Panel B of the NETCOST pension expense. GAAP 
PENSEXP is pension expense as currently reported under SFAS Nos. 87 and 132. NETCOST PENSEXP is 
defined as service cost plus the excess of interest cost over the actual return on pension plan assets. Positive 

























   
Table 4 OLS Aggregate and Disaggregated Pension Expense Regressions 
Panel A: Aggregate  Regressions












Adj. R2 51.05 50.45
N 3,388 3,388
Panel B: Disaggregated  Pension Expense Regressions 
GAAP Method NETCOST Method NETCOST Method
(excluding 0 interest cost)
 INTERCEPT 12.10 11.96 8.64
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
 ADJNI 7.63 7.60 7.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 PENSEXP -9.42 -1.55 -0.81
(0.00) (0.09) (0.47)
 BVEADJ 0.29 0.30 0.24
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 NPA  0.48 . .
(0.00) . .
 FAIRNPA . 1.44 1.62
. (0.00) (0.00)
 FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM . -1.18 -1.75
. (0.00) (0.01)
 EMPL 0.05 0.05 0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 R&D 2.38 2.67 2.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Summary Statistics
Adj. R2 51.64 51.18 46.16
N 3,388 3,388 1,594  
Notes 
The table presents coefficient estimates and two-tailed probability values (in parentheses) of the aggregate 
(Panel A) and disaggregated pension expense OLS regressions (Panel B). 
 
0 1 2jt jt jMVE NI BVE t jtβ β β= + + +ε  (1) 
 
{ } { }0 1 2 3 4jt jt jt jt jt jtMVE ADJNI PENSEXP BVEADJ NPAβ β β β β= + + + + +ε  (2) 
 
NI is GAAP net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. NETCOST NI is GAAP net 
income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus the after-tax reported pension expense 
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minus the after-tax NETCOST Method pension expense. BVE is the book value of common equity. ADJNI 
is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus the after-tax reported pension 
expense. GAAP PENSEXP is pension expense as currently reported under SFAS Nos. 87 and 132. 
NETCOST Method PENSEXP is defined as service cost plus the excess of interest cost over the actual 
return on pension plan assets. BVEADJ is the book value of common equity excluding the recognized net 
pension asset. NPA is the recognized net pension asset. FAIRNPA is the fair value net pension asset. 
FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM is an interaction variable equal to FAIRNPA multiplied by a dummy variable, 
SURPLUS_DUM, equal to 1 if the pension plan is overfunded, and 0 otherwise. EMPL and R&D are also 
included in all model specifications. EMPL is the number of employees and R&D is research and 
development expense. All variables, except EMPL, are deflated by the number of common shares 
outstanding at fiscal year-end, adjusted for stock splits and dividends. Fixed-year and industry effects are 































   
Table 5 Disaggregated Pension Expense Component Regressions 
GAAP Method FV1 Method FV1 Method FV2 Method FV3 Method NETCOST Method NETCOST Method 
(excluding 0 interest cost)
 INTERCEPT 10.79 13.63 13.71 12.97 13.06 11.85 8.65
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
 ADJNI 7.71 8.50 8.46 8.50 8.48 7.66 7.67
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 SERVCOST -6.84 -11.02 -9.92 -10.44 -10.69 -4.26 -9.87
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01)
 INTCOST  -12.89 -20.43 -19.22 3.60 -20.13 . .
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) . .
 ADJINT . . . . . -0.61 2.22
. . . . . (0.58) (0.14)
 OTHER_COST -6.79 . . . . . .
(0.00) . . . . . .
 OTHER_FAIRCOST . -0.23 -0.23 . . . .
. (0.53) (0.53) . . . .
 NETOTHER_FAIRCOST . . . -1.83 -1.95 . .
. . . (0.00) (0.00) . .
$EXP_RETURN 8.36 15.42 15.50 . 17.99 . .
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) . (0.00) . .
$UNEXP_RETURN . . . . 1.07 . .
. . . . (0.02) . .
$ACTUAL_RETURN . . . 0.53 . . .
. . . (0.22) . . .
 BVEADJ 0.34 0.25 0.27 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.26
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 NPA  0.95 . . . . . .
(0.00) . . . . . .
 FAIRNPA . 0.20 0.80 1.44 0.47 1.35 1.48
. (0.43) (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)
 FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM . . -1.25 . . -1.01 -1.58
. . (0.01) . . (0.01) (0.02)
 EMPL 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 R&D 2.81 3.13 3.19 3.30 3.29 2.75 3.17
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Summary Statistics
Adj. R2 52.28 54.75 54.92 54.01 55.17 51.20 46.37
N 3,388 2,312 2,312 2,312 2,312 3,388 1,594  
Notes 
The table presents coefficient estimates and two-tailed probability values (in parentheses) of the disaggregated pension expense component OLS regressions.  
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 jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt NPABVEADJRETURNEXPCOSTOTHERINTCOSTSERVCOSTADJNIMVE εββββββββ ++++++++= 76543210 _$_     (3) 
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ADJNI is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus the after-tax reported pension expense. SERVCOST is the service cost. 
INTCOST is the reported interest cost. OTHER_COST represents all other pension costs associated with defined benefit pension plans that do not fall into any of 
the other categories. $EXP_RETURN is the expected dollar return on pension plan assets. BVEADJ is the book value of common equity excluding the recognized 
net pension asset. NPA is the recognized net pension asset. OTHER_FAIRCOST is fair value other pension costs including the actuarial gains and losses under fair 
value accounting. FAIRNPA is the fair value net pension asset. $ACTUAL_RETURN is the actual dollar return on pension plan assets. NETOTHER_FAIRCOST is 
the difference between OTHER_FAIRCOST and $UNEXP_RETURN. $UNEXP_RETURN is the difference between $ACTUAL_RETURN and $EXP_RETURN. 
ADJINT is the NETCOST Method interest cost defined as the excess of interest cost over the actual return on pension plan assets. FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM is 
an interaction variable equal to FAIRNPA multiplied by a dummy variable, SURPLUS_DUM, equal to 1 if the pension plan is overfunded, and 0 otherwise. 
EMPL and R&D are also included in all model specifications. EMPL is the number of employees and R&D is research and development expense. All variables, 
except EMPL, are deflated by the number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year-end, adjusted for stock splits and dividends. Fixed-year and industry 
effects are included in all model specifications. P-values are White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
 jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt DUMSURPLUSFAIRNPAFAIRNPABVEADJADJINTSERVCOSTADJNIMVE εβββββββ +++++++= _*6543210     (8) 
 
 
   
Table 6 Alternative NETCOST Method Specifications 
EQ. (9) EQ. (10)
 INTERCEPT 12.68 12.68
(0.00) (0.00)
 ADJNI 8.51 8.47
(0.00) (0.00)
 SERVCOST -7.92 -10.42
(0.01) (0.00)
 INTCOST  . -17.64
. (0.00)
 INTCOST-ACTUAL_RETURN 2.57 .
(0.00) .
 FIN_DUM 1.53 1.04
(0.04) (0.22)
 (INTCOST-ACTUAL_RETURN)*FIN_DUM -5.94 .
(0.00) .
 NETOTHER_FAIRCOST -1.50 -2.04
(0.00) (0.00)
 EXP_RETURN . 15.41
. (0.00)
 UNEXP_RETURN . -0.87
. (0.36)
 INTCOST*FIN_DUM . -2.14
. (0.63)
 EXP_RETURN*FIN_DUM . 2.66
. (0.48)
 UNEXP_RETURN*FIN_DUM . 3.92
. (0.01)
 BVEADJ 0.24 0.28
(0.00) (0.00)
 FAIRNPA 1.64 1.10
(0.00) (0.00)
 FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM -1.16 -1.39
(0.01) (0.00)
 EMPL 0.04 0.03
(0.00) (0.00)
 R&D 3.35 3.40
(0.00) (0.00)
Summary Statistics
Adj. R2 54.63 55.52
N 2,312 2,312  
Notes 
The table presents coefficient estimates and two-tailed probability values (in parentheses) of alternative 
NETCOST Method OLS model specifications.  
 























   

































    (10) 
ADJNI is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus the after-tax reported 
pension expense. SERVCOST is the service cost. INTCOST is the reported interest cost. INTCOST-
$ACTUAL_RETURN is the difference between interest cost and actual dollar return on pension plan 
assets. (INTCOST-$ACTUAL_RETURN)*FIN_DUM is an interaction variable equal to INTCOST-
$ACTUAL_RETURN  multiplied  by FIN_DUM. FIN_DUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if SFAS 
Nos. 87 and 132 interest cost is less than the actual return on pension plan assets, and 0 otherwise. 
BVEADJ is the book value of common equity excluding the recognized net pension asset. FAIRNPA is 
the fair value net pension asset. FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM is an interaction variable equal to 
FAIRNPA multiplied by a dummy variable, SURPLUS_DUM, equal to 1 if the pension plan is 
overfunded, and 0 otherwise. $EXP_RETURN is the expected dollar return on pension plan assets. 
$UNEXP_RETURN is the difference between $ACTUAL_RETURN and $EXP_RETURN. 
INTCOST*FIN_DUM is an interaction variable equal to INTCOST multiplied by FIN_DUM. 
$EXP_RETURN*FIN_DUM is an interaction variable equal to $EXP_RETURN multiplied by 
FIN_DUM. $UNEXP_RETURN*FIN_DUM is an interaction variable equal to $UNEXP_RETURN 
multiplied by FIN_DUM. NETOTHER_FAIRCOST is the difference between OTHER_FAIRCOST and 
$UNEXP_RETURN. EMPL and R&D are also included in all model specifications. EMPL is the number 
of employees and R&D is research and development expense. All variables, except EMPL, are deflated 
by the number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year-end, adjusted for stock splits and dividends. 






























   
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of Pension Plans’ Funding Status 
Panel A: Funding Status by Year
Mean Median Std Dev
PENSASSET 2071.0 299.4 6657.1
PENSLIAB 1865.1 302.1 5737.8
FUNDING 205.9 -2.7 1356.1
PENSASSET 2174.9 324.3 7081.2
PENSLIAB 1687.4 266.8 5195.9
FUNDING 487.5 23.9 2171.9
PENSASSET 2021.5 200.5 7677.5
PENSLIAB 1699.8 189.8 6534.2
FUNDING 321.7 2.0 1807.9
PENSASSET 1209.3 123.4 4490.5
PENSLIAB 1328.6 139.6 4325.1
FUNDING -119.3 -10.5 1127.6
PENSASSET 1076.3 126.1 3423.3
PENSLIAB 1488.5 170.8 4406.5
FUNDING -412.2 -38.4 1403.1
PENSASSET 1638.8 173.5 5398.8
PENSLIAB 2162.8 243.5 6515.9
FUNDING -524.0 -50.0 1811.2
PENSASSET 1865.2 184.0 6019.2
PENSLIAB 2376.0 255.9 7121.4
FUNDING -510.8 -47.4 1690.6
PENSASSET 2087.5 197.5 7034.9
PENSLIAB 2470.3 261.0 7678.4
FUNDING -382.8 -49.9 1213.8
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Funding Status
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
PENSASSET 2882.6 367.5 8646.9 1378.4 151.0 4880.9
PENSLIAB 2351.5 304.9 7107.8 1791.9 208.2 5839.5
FR 1.229 1.144 0.305 0.738 0.762 0.172
NPA 0.913 0.230 1.642 0.092 -0.029 1.456
GAAP PENSEXP -0.046 -0.001 0.249 0.186 0.098 0.276
NETCOST PENSEXP 0.310 0.166 0.423 0.277 0.148 0.380
$EXP_RETURN 0.724 0.402 0.849 0.406 0.174 0.606
$ACTUAL_RETURN 0.727 0.281 1.365 0.299 0.076 0.923
LEV 0.556 0.566 0.166 0.563 0.570 0.182
PROF 0.064 0.056 0.047 0.068 0.056 0.063
Year = 1998 (N=273)
Year = 1999 (N=332)
Year = 2000 (N=399)
Year = 2001 (N=400)
Overfunded Plans (N=833) Underfunded Plans (N=2,555)
Year = 2002 (N=449)
Year = 2003 (N=487)
Year = 2004 (N=557)
Year = 2005 (N=491)
 
Notes 
The table presents descriptive statistics of the pension plans’ funding status. Panel A presents yearly 
descriptive statistics regarding the fair value of pension plan assets, projected benefit obligations and 
funding status. PENSASSET is the fair value of pension plan assets and PENSLIAB is the projected benefit 
obligation. FUNDING is the difference between pension plan assets (PENSASSET) and pension liabilities 
(PENSLIAB). Panel B presents descriptive statistics for overfunded and underfunded pension plans. 
PENSASSET and PENSLIAB are as defined above. FR is the funding ratio defined as PENSASSET over 
PENSLIAB. NPA is recognized net pension assets deflated by the number of common shares outstanding at 
fiscal year-end, adjusted for stock splits and dividends. GAAP PENSEXP and NETCOST PENSEXP is 
GAAP and NETCOST pension expense respectively. GAAP PENSEXP is pension expense as currently 
reported under SFAS Nos. 87 and 132 deflated by the number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year-
end, adjusted for stock splits and dividends. NETCOST Method PENSEXP is defined as service cost plus 
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the excess of interest cost over the actual return on pension plan assets deflated by the number of common 
shares outstanding at fiscal year-end, adjusted for stock splits and dividends. $EXP_RETURN is the 
expected dollar return on pension plan assets and $ACTUAL_RETURN is the actual dollar return on 
pension plan assets, both deflated by the number of common shares outstanding at fiscal year-end, adjusted 
















































   
Table 8 Disaggregated Pension Expense Regressions by Funding Status 
GAAP Method NETCOST Method NETCOST Method
(excluding 0 interest cost)
 INTERCEPT 12.37 12.08 8.83
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
 ADJNI 7.60 7.58 7.55
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 PENSEXP (Underf.) -11.52 -0.38 -0.62
(0.00) (0.74) (0.67)
 PENSEXP*SURPLUS_DUM 6.98 -3.07 -0.41
(0.01) (0.08) (0.86)
 SURPLUS_DUM -1.51 0.15 -0.63
(0.03) (0.84) (0.58)
 BVEADJ 0.31 0.30 0.24
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 NPA  0.68 . .
(0.00) . .
 FAIRNPA . 1.61 1.68
. (0.00) (0.00)
 FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM . -1.15 -1.67
. (0.00) (0.01)
 EMPL 0.05 0.05 0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 R&D 2.45 2.70 2.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adj. R2 51.84 51.22 46.11
N 3,388 3,388 1,594  
Notes 
The table presents coefficient estimates and two-tailed probability values (in parentheses) of the GAAP and 
NETCOST disaggregated pension expense OLS regressions for overfunded and underfunded plans. ADJNI 
is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus the after-tax reported pension 
expense. GAAP PENSEXP is pension expense as currently reported under SFAS Nos. 87 and 132. 
NETCOST Method PENSEXP is defined as service cost plus the excess of interest cost over the actual 
return on pension plan assets. PENSEXP*SURPLUS_DUM is an interaction variable equal to 
GAAP/NETCOST pension expense multiplied by SURPLUS_DUM. SURPLUS_DUM is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the pension plan is overfunded, and 0 otherwise. BVEADJ is the book value of common equity 
excluding the recognized net pension asset. NPA is the recognized net pension asset. FAIRNPA is the fair 
value net pension asset. FAIRNPA*SURPLUS_DUM is an interaction variable equal to FAIRNPA 
multiplied by SURPLUS_DUM. EMPL is the number of employees and R&D is research and development 
expense. All variables, except EMPL, are deflated by the number of common shares outstanding at fiscal 
year-end, adjusted for stock splits and dividends. Fixed-year and industry effects are included in all model 


















   
Table 9 Jack-knife Regressions 
Panel A: Aggregate  Regressions 
GAAP Method NETCOST Method
1,802 (53.19%) 1,586 (46.81%)
Panel B: Disaggregated  Pension Expense Regressions
GAAP Method NETCOST Method
1,762 (52.01) 1,626 (47.99)
Panel C: Disaggregated Pension Expense Component Regressions 
GAAP Method NETCOST Method FV1 Method FV2 Method FV3 Method
1,826 (53.90) 1,562 (46.10) . . .
. . 788 (23.26, 52.57) 804 (23.73, 48.85) 720 (21.25, 62.10)  
Notes 
The table presents the results of Jack-knife regressions. Panel A presents the results of the aggregate 
regressions, Panel B of the disaggregated pension expense regressions and Panel C of the disaggregated 
pension expense component regressions. The row number below each method represents the number of 
times that each method terminates first with the lowest prediction errors (% in parentheses). The 
cumulative percent (%) (how many times each method terminates first or second) is presented for the 
disaggregated FV pension expense component regressions in Panel C (second number inside the 
parentheses). 
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